Attach to Form 990 or Form 990-EZ.
Go to
www.irs.gov/Form990 for the latest information.
| (i) Name of supported organization | (ii) EIN | (iii) Type of organization (described on lines 1- 10 above (see instructions)) | (iv) Is the organization listed in your governing document? | (v) Amount of monetary support (see instructions) | (vi) Amount of other support (see instructions) | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Yes | No | |||||
|
Total |
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Calendar year (or fiscal year beginning in) ![]() |
(a) 2014 | (b) 2015 | (c) 2016 | (d) 2017 | (e) 2018 | (f) Total | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | Gifts, grants, contributions, and membership fees received. (Do not include any "unusual grant.") .. | 561,704 | 313,610 | 484,180 | 266,841 | 517,652 | 2,143,987 |
| 2 | Tax revenues levied for the organization's benefit and either paid to or expended on its behalf.... | ||||||
| 3 | The value of services or facilities furnished by a governmental unit to the organization without charge.. | ||||||
| 4 | Total. Add lines 1 through 3 | 561,704 | 313,610 | 484,180 | 266,841 | 517,652 | 2,143,987 |
| 5 | The portion of total contributions by each person (other than a governmental unit or publicly supported organization) included on line 1 that exceeds 2% of the amount shown on line 11, column (f).. | 543,602 | |||||
| 6 | Public support. Subtract line 5 from line 4. | 1,600,385 | |||||
Calendar year
(or fiscal year beginning in) ![]() |
(a) 2014 | (b) 2015 | (c) 2016 | (d) 2017 | (e) 2018 | (f) Total | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 7 | Amounts from line 4.. | 561,704 | 313,610 | 484,180 | 266,841 | 517,652 | 2,143,987 |
| 8 | Gross income from interest, dividends, payments received on securities loans, rents, royalties and income from similar sources... | 256 | 176 | 115 | 255 | 338 | 1,140 |
| 9 | Net income from unrelated business activities, whether or not the business is regularly carried on.. | ||||||
| 10 | Other income. Do not include gain or loss from the sale of capital assets (Explain in Part VI.).. | ||||||
| 11 | Total support. Add lines 7 through 10 | 2,145,127 | |||||
Calendar year (or fiscal year beginning in) ![]() |
(a) 2014 | (b) 2015 | (c) 2016 | (d) 2017 | (e) 2018 | (f) Total | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | Gifts, grants, contributions, and membership fees received. (Do not include any "unusual grants.") . | ||||||
| 2 | Gross receipts from admissions, merchandise sold or services performed, or facilities furnished in any activity that is related to the organization's tax-exempt purpose | ||||||
| 3 | Gross receipts from activities that are not an unrelated trade or business under section 513 ..... | ||||||
| 4 | Tax revenues levied for the organization's benefit and either paid to or expended on its behalf... | ||||||
| 5 | The value of services or facilities furnished by a governmental unit to the organization without charge | ||||||
| 6 | Total. Add lines 1 through 5 | ||||||
| 7a | Amounts included on lines 1, 2, and 3 received from disqualified persons | ||||||
| b | Amounts included on lines 2 and 3 received from other than disqualified persons that exceed the greater of $5,000 or 1% of the amount on line 13 for the year. | ||||||
| c | Add lines 7a and 7b.. | ||||||
| 8 | Public support. (Subtract line 7c from line 6.) | ||||||
Calendar year (or fiscal year beginning in) ![]() |
(a) 2014 | (b) 2015 | (c) 2016 | (d) 2017 | (e) 2018 | (f) Total | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 9 | Amounts from line 6... | ||||||
| 10a | Gross income from interest, dividends, payments received on securities loans, rents, royalties and income from similar sources.. | ||||||
| b | Unrelated business taxable income (less section 511 taxes) from businesses acquired after June 30, 1975. | ||||||
| c | Add lines 10a and 10b. | ||||||
| 11 | Net income from unrelated business activities not included in line 10b, whether or not the business is regularly carried on. | ||||||
| 12 | Other income. Do not include gain or loss from the sale of capital assets (Explain in Part VI.) .. | ||||||
| 13 | Total support. (Add lines 9, 10c, 11, and 12.).. | ||||||
| Section A - Adjusted Net Income | (A) Prior Year |
(B) Current Year (optional) |
||||
| 1 | Net short-term capital gain | 1 | ||||
| 2 | Recoveries of prior-year distributions | 2 | ||||
| 3 | Other gross income (see instructions) | 3 | ||||
| 4 | Add lines 1 through 3 | 4 | ||||
| 5 | Depreciation and depletion | 5 | ||||
| 6 | Portion of operating expenses paid or incurred for production or collection of gross income or for management, conservation, or maintenance of property held for production of income (see instructions) | 6 | ||||
| 7 | Other expenses (see instructions) | 7 | ||||
| 8 | Adjusted Net Income (subtract lines 5, 6 and 7 from line 4) | 8 | ||||
| Section B - Minimum Asset Amount | (A) Prior Year |
(B) Current Year (optional) |
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| 1 | Aggregate fair market value of all non-exempt-use assets (see instructions for short tax year or assets held for part of year): | 1 | ||||
| a | Average monthly value of securities | 1a | ||||
| b | Average monthly cash balances | 1b | ||||
| c | Fair market value of other non-exempt-use assets | 1c | ||||
| d | Total (add lines 1a, 1b, and 1c) | 1d | ||||
| e |
Discount claimed for blockage or other factors (explain in detail in Part VI): |
|||||
| 2 | Acquisition indebtedness applicable to non-exempt use assets | 2 | ||||
| 3 | Subtract line 2 from line 1d | 3 | ||||
| 4 | Cash deemed held for exempt use. Enter 1-1/2% of line 3 (for greater amount, see instructions). | 4 | ||||
| 5 | Net value of non-exempt-use assets (subtract line 4 from line 3) | 5 | ||||
| 6 | Multiply line 5 by .035 | 6 | ||||
| 7 | Recoveries of prior-year distributions | 7 | ||||
| 8 | Minimum Asset Amount (add line 7 to line 6) | 8 | ||||
| Section C - Distributable Amount | Current Year | |||||
| 1 | Adjusted net income for prior year (from Section A, line 8, Column A) | 1 | ||||
| 2 | Enter 85% of line 1 | 2 | ||||
| 3 | Minimum asset amount for prior year (from Section B, line 8, Column A) | 3 | ||||
| 4 | Enter greater of line 2 or line 3 | 4 | ||||
| 5 | Income tax imposed in prior year | 5 | ||||
| 6 | Distributable Amount. Subtract line 5 from line 4, unless subject to emergency temporary reduction (see instructions) | 6 | ||||
| Section D - Distributions | Current Year | |
|---|---|---|
| 1 Amounts paid to supported organizations to accomplish exempt purposes | ||
|
2
Amounts paid to perform activity that directly furthers exempt purposes of supported organizations, in excess of income from activity |
||
| 3 Administrative expenses paid to accomplish exempt purposes of supported organizations | ||
| 4 Amounts paid to acquire exempt-use assets | ||
| 5 Qualified set-aside amounts (prior IRS approval required) | ||
| 6 Other distributions (describe in Part VI). See instructions | ||
| 7Total annual distributions. Add lines 1 through 6. | ||
|
8
Distributions to attentive supported organizations to which the organization is responsive (provide details in Part VI). See instructions |
||
| 9 Distributable amount for 2018 from Section C, line 6 | ||
| 10 Line 8 amount divided by Line 9 amount | ||
| Section E - Distribution Allocations (see instructions) |
(i) Excess Distributions |
(ii) Underdistributions Pre-2018 |
(iii) Distributable Amount for 2018 |
|
|---|---|---|---|---|
|
1
Distributable amount for 2018 from Section C, line 6 |
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|
2
Underdistributions, if any, for years prior to 2018 (reasonable cause required-- explain in Part VI). See instructions. |
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| 3 Excess distributions carryover, if any, to 2018: | ||||
| a From 2013....... | ||||
| b From 2014....... | ||||
| c From 2015....... | ||||
| d From 2016....... | ||||
| e From 2017....... | ||||
| fTotal of lines 3a through e | ||||
| g Applied to underdistributions of prior years | ||||
| h Applied to 2018 distributable amount | ||||
|
i
Carryover from 2013 not applied (see instructions) |
||||
| j Remainder. Subtract lines 3g, 3h, and 3i from 3f. | ||||
| 4Distributions for 2018 from Section D, line 7: | ||||
| $ | ||||
| a Applied to underdistributions of prior years | ||||
| b Applied to 2018 distributable amount | ||||
| c Remainder. Subtract lines 4a and 4b from 4. | ||||
|
5
Remaining underdistributions for years prior to 2018, if any. Subtract lines 3g and 4a from line 2. If the amount is greater than zero, explain in Part VI. See instructions. |
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|
6
Remaining underdistributions for 2018. Subtract lines 3h and 4b from line 1. If the amount is greater than zero, explain in Part VI. See instructions. |
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|
7 Excess distributions carryover to 2019. Add lines 3j and 4c. |
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| 8 Breakdown of line 7: | ||||
| a Excess from 2014...... | ||||
| b Excess from 2015..... | ||||
| c Excess from 2016..... | ||||
| d Excess from 2017..... | ||||
| e Excess from 2018..... | ||||
| Facts And Circumstances Test |
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| Return Reference | Explanation |
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| Software ID: | |
| Software Version: |
Attach to Form 990 or 990-EZ.
Go to www.irs.gov/Form990 for the latest information.
| Return Reference | Explanation |
|---|---|
| FORM 990, PART III, LINE 4A, DESCRIPTION OF PROGRAM SERVICE: | SOME OF THE PRINCIPAL AREAS ON WHICH WE FOCUSED IN 2018 WERE: CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES ATLANTIC LEGAL FOUNDATION PARTICIPATES IN IMPORTANT CASES SEEKING TO LIMIT THE EXPANSIVE AND CAPRICIOUS EXERCISE OF GOVERNMENTAL POWER. THE ISSUES WE HAVE ADDRESSED INCLUDE CHALLENGING THE EXPANSION OF BUREAUCRATIC POWER, STATE AND LOCAL ATTEMPTS TO REGULATE INTERSTATE AND FOREIGN COMMERCE, COMBATING LIMITS ON FREE SPEECH IN PUBLIC FORA AND ON COLLEGE CAMPUSES, AND OPPOSING EXPANSIVE ASSERTIONS OF U.S. COURT JURISDICTION OVER FOREIGN ENTITIES AND TRANSACTIONS. SOUND SCIENCE IN LITIGATION AND REGULATION ATLANTIC LEGAL IS THE NATION'S PREEMINENT PUBLIC INTEREST LAW FIRM ADVOCATING FOR THE ADMISSIBILITY OF SOUND MEDICAL AND EXPERT TESTIMONY IN TOXIC TORT, PRODUCT LIABILITY AND OTHER LITIGATION. ATLANTIC LEGAL FIGHTS THE ADMISSIBILITY OF "JUNK" SCIENCE, AND FOSTERS THE USE OF SOUND SCIENCE PRINCIPLES IN JUDICIAL AND REGULATORY PROCEEDINGS. OUR AMICUS BRIEFS ON BEHALF OF NUMEROUS NOBEL LAUREATES AND MANY OTHER PROMINENT SCIENTISTS WERE CITED AND RELIED ON BY THE MAJORITY IN THE LANDMARK DAUBERT TRILOGY OF U. S. SUPREME COURT CASES AS WELL AS CASES IN FEDERAL APPELLATE COURTS AND THE HIGHEST COURTS OF THE MOST POPULOUS STATES, INCLUDING CALIFORNIA, FLORIDA, NEW YORK AND PENNSYLVANIA. ISSUES IMPACTING THE MARKET ECONOMY ATLANTIC LEGAL ADVOCATES AGAINST INTRUSIVE REGULATION OF BUSINESS AND ADVOCATES FOR RESPONSIBLE CORPORATE GOVERNANCE. THE FOUNDATION WAS AN EARLY PROPONENT OF PRESERVATION OF THE ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE AGAINST COMPULSORY WAIVER OF THAT ESSENTIAL PROTECTION WHERE CORPORATE MISCONDUCT HAS BEEN ASSERTED. IT HAS CHALLENGED ABUSE OF CLASS ACTION PROCEDURES AND HAS STRONGLY ADVOCATED FOR THE ENFORCEMENT OF ARBITRATION AGREEMENTS. EDUCATIONAL CHOICE ATLANTIC LEGAL ACTIVELY SUPPORTS CHARTER SCHOOLS. A MAJOR PART OF THIS EFFORT IS PUBLISHING A SERIES OF STATE LAW GUIDES, WRITTEN BY NATIONALLY KNOWN LABOR LAW ATTORNEYS, TO EDUCATE CHARTER SCHOOL LEADERS ABOUT HOW TO DEAL WITH EFFORTS BY PUBLIC EMPLOYEE UNIONS TO ORGANIZE THE TEACHING STAFF AND TO CURB OR BURDEN CHARTER SCHOOLS WITH INTRUSIVE UNION WORK RULES THAT STIFLE INNOVATION; THE LAW IN THIS AREA IS BOTH NATIONAL AND STATE-SPECIFIC, AND WE HAVE PUBLISHED OUR "LEVELING THE PLAYING FIELD" GUIDES FOR SEVERAL LARGE STATES INCLUDING CALIFORNIA, NEW YORK, MICHIGAN AND MASSACHUSETTS. THERE HAVE BEEN SIGNIFICANT DEVELOPMENTS IN THIS AREA OF THE LAW RECENTLY, SO WE TOGETHER WITH THE PROMINENT NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS LAW FIRM OF JACKSON LEWIS PC HAVE EMBARKED ON SIGNIFICANT REVISIONS TO THE "LEVELING" SERIES; THE FIRST, COVERING CALIFORNIA, WAS PUBLISHED IN JUNE 2017. THE FOUNDATION ALSO PROVIDES LEGAL COUNSEL TO AND REPRESENTS CHARTER SCHOOLS AND CHARTER SCHOOL ADVOCATES IN COURT AT NO COST. CASES IN 2018 THE FOUNDATION'S PRINCIPAL LEGAL ACTIVITY CONSISTS OF FILING AMICUS BRIEFS IN THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT, FEDERAL APPELLATE COURTS, AND THE HIGHEST COURTS OF SEVERAL KEY STATES. IN 2018 WE FILED BRIEFS IN A NUMBER OF SIGNIFICANT CASES INVOLVING A VARIETY OF CRITICAL ISSUES AND COMMENCED WORK ON OTHER CASES IN WHICH WE FILED BRIEFS IN 2019. IN ADDITION TO THE CASES IN WHICH WE FILED BRIEFS, THE FOUNDATION'S STAFF SPENS SUBSTANTIAL TIME RESEARCHING, ANALYZING AND PRESENT TO THE FOUNDATION'S BOARD NUMEROUS CASES IN WHICH WE ULTIMATELY DECIDE NOT TO PARTICIPATE. OUR CASES COME TO US IN NUMEROUS WAYS: REQUESTS FROM LAW FIRMS, PRINCIPALLY LAW FIRMS WITH ESTABLISHED SUPREME COURT PRACTICES, TO SUPPORT THEM EITHER ON THE MERITS OR AT THE PETITION STAGE; REQUESTS DIRECTLY FROM POTENTIAL AMICUS CLIENTS, INCLUDING TRADE ASSOCIATIONS, CIVIC ASSOCIATIONS, THINK TANKS, AND INDIVIDUALS OR GROUPS OF INDIVIDUALS; PERUSAL OF LEGAL, SCIENTIFIC AND INDUSTRY PERIODICALS AND ONLINE BLOGS THAT REPORT ON LEGAL MATTERS OF INTEREST TO THAT TRADE OR PROFESSION; BULLETINS AND "AMICUS CONFERENCE CALLS" FROM THE HERITAGE FOUNDATION AND SIMILAR GROUPS; AD HOC DISCUSSIONS WITH OTHER LAWYERS IN PUBLIC INTEREST LAW FIRMS AND IN PRIVATE PRACTICE; AND CONSULTATIONS WITH MEMBERS OF ATLANTIC LEGAL'S BOARD OF DIRECTORS AND ADVISORY COUNCIL. THE VERY NATURE OF THESE SOURCES TENDS TO APPRISE US OF CURRENT "HOT" ISSUES OF IMPORTANCE. ONCE A CASE COMES TO THE ATTENTION OF ATLANTIC LEGAL'S STAFF, IT IS DISCUSSED WITH EITHER THE BOARD OR THE EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE OF THE BOARD, DEPENDING ON THE TIME CONSTRAINTS. COMPELLED SPEECH - WHETHER RETAIL STORES CAN BE REQUIRED TO POST SIGNS WARNING CUSTOMERS OF THE "DANGERS" OF CELL PHONES, WHEN THE FCC (WHICH BY FEDERAL LAW HAS SUPERVISORY JURISDICTION OVER CELLULAR DEVICES) AND THE CONSENSUS OF RELEVANT SCIENTIFIC ORGANIZATIONS HAS FOUND NO EMISSION OF DANGEROUS LEVELS OF IONIZING RADIATION BY CELL PHONES. THIS CASE INVOLVES BOTH FREE SPEECH ISSUES AND SOUND SCIENCE ISSUES. ARBITRATION OF DISPUTES - DESPITE A CLEAR STATUTORY ENACTMENT FAVORING ARBITRATION AS AN EFFECTIVE AND EFFICIENT ALTERNATIVE TO PROTRACTED, EXPENSIVE AND BURDENSOME LITIGATION, MANY STATE AND LOWER FEDERAL COURTS REMAIN HOSTILE TO ENFORCEMENT OF CONTRACTUAL ARBITRATION PROVISIONS. AS A RESULT, THE SUPREME COURT HAS BEEN CALLED UPON SEVERAL TIMES IN THE PAST FEW YEARS TO REITERATE ITS HOLDINGS INSTRUCTING INFERIOR COURTS TO ENFORCE AND APPLY THE FEDERAL ARBITRATION ACT. ATLANTIC LEGAL HAS FREQUENTLY FILED AMICUS BRIEFS IN THOSE CASES, INCLUDING WHAT HAS BEEN CALLED THE "BLOCKBUSTER EPIC SYSTEMS CASE." ONE LEADING SUPREME COURT PRACTITIONER RECENTLY "RECOGNIZE[D] THE ALF'S STRONG TRACK RECORD IN ADVOCATING FOR THE FAIR ENFORCEMENT OF ARBITRATION AGREEMENTS, AS WELL AS ADDRESSING ISSUES AFFECTING THE BUSINESS COMMUNITY GENERALLY." ADMISSIBILITY OF EXPERT TESTIMONY ON EXPOSURE TO ALLEGED TOXINS AND MEDICAL CAUSATION OF DISEASE - THESE CASES, IN STATE AND FEDERAL APPELLATE COURTS, TYPICALLY INVOLVE THE ISSUE WHETHER AN EXPERT'S CAUSATION TESTIMONY BASED ON "CUMULATIVE EXPOSURE" THAT DOES NOT IDENTIFY A SPECIFIC DEFENDANT'S PRODUCT AS THE CAUSE OF THE DISEASE OR FAILS TO QUANTIFY THE PLAINTIFF'S EXPOSURE IS CONSISTENT WITH SOUND SCIENCE AND ADMISSIBLE. IN THE NEW YORK COURT OF APPEALS WE REPRESENTED A GROUP OF SCIENTISTS IN SUBMITTING AN AMICUS BRIEF IN AN ASBESTOS-MESOTHELIOMA CASE THAT RESULTED IN THE COURT REJECTING PLAINTIFF'S "CUMULATIVE EXPOSURE" THEORY OF ASBESTOS DISEASE CAUSATION. OUR BRIEF, ON BEHALF OF SEVERAL PROMINENT SCIENTISTS AND DOCTORS WITH EXPERTISE IN TOXICOLOGY, PATHOLOGY, MINERALOGY AND OTHER RELEVANT DISCIPLINES, POINTED OUT THAT THE "CUMULATIVE EXPOSURE" THEORY IS NOT SUPPORTED BY THE OVERWHELMING CONSENSUS OF RELEVANT EPIDEMIOLOGICAL STUDIES, AND, EVEN IF IT WERE SO SUPPORTED, WOULD NOT PROVE "SPECIFIC CAUSATION" AS REQUIRED BY NEW YORK LAW. THE NEW YORK SPECIAL ASBESTOS COURT, BASED IN NEW YORK CITY, HAD HERETOFORE BEEN KNOWN AS AN "ASBESTOS LIABILITY HELL-HOLE." ALTHOUGH JUNI V, A.O. SMITH DID NOT BREAK NEW GROUND IN NEW YORK LAW ON MEDICAL CAUSATION, IT APPLIED THOSE PRINCIPLES IN AN ASBESTOS CASE AND AFFIRMED AN EXCELLENT AND WELL-REASONED DECISION OF THE LOWER COURTS. AS A RESULT OF THIS SALUTARY DECISION, WE HAVE ALREADY SEEN AN UPTICK IN THE WILLINGNESS OF TRIAL LEVEL COURTS TO GRANT MOTIONS IN LIMINE AND TO DISMISS CASES BASED ON WEAK EXPERT EVIDENCE. THE FLORIDA SUPREME COURT REVERSED ITSELF IN A SIGNIFICANT CASE ON THE ADMISSIBILITY OF EXPERT TESTIMONY ON EXPOSURE TO ASBESTOS AND CAUSATION OF MESOTHELIOMA. THIS CASE INVOLVED TWO ISSUES: (1) SEPARATION OF POWERS WHETHER THE LEGISLATURE CAN ENACT A LAW GOVERNING THE ADMISSIBILITY OF EVIDENCE, OR WHETHER THAT INFRINGES THE POWER OF THE JUDICIAL BRANCH; AND (2) WHETHER AN EXPERT'S CAUSATION TESTIMONY BASED ON "CUMULATIVE EXPOSURE" THAT DOES NOT IDENTIFY A SPECIFIC DEFENDANT'S PRODUCT AS THE CAUSE OF THE DISEASE IS CONSISTENT WITH SOUND SCIENCE AND ADMISSIBLE. THE FLORIDA SUPREME COURT INITIALLY HELD THAT THE STATE LEGISLATURE'S ADOPTION OF AMENDMENTS TO THE RULES OF EVIDENCE ADOPTING A "DAUBERT" STANDARD CONTRAVENED THE JUDICIARY'S CONSTITUTIONAL POWER TO DETERMINE JUDICIAL PROCEDURES AND THUS WAS VOID. SUBSEQUENTLY, IN THE SAME CASE IN WHICH ATLANTIC LEGAL FILED AN AMICUS BRIEF ON BEHALF OF SEVERAL PROMINENT SCIENTISTS -- BUT AFTER A CHANGE IN THE COMPOSITION OF THE COURT, THE COURT ITSELF APPROVED THE DAUBERT-LIKE ANALYSIS OF THE ADMISSIBILITY OF EXPERT TESTIMONY WHICH WE HAD ADVOCATED. AS A RESULT, FLORIDA HAS JOINED A GROWING MAJORITY OF STATES THAT HAVE ADOPTED DAUBERT CRITERIA. THIS IS ANOTHER EXAMPLE OF ATLANTIC LEGAL QUIETLY MAKING A DIFFERENCE AND IMPROVING JURISPRUDENCE. DUE PROCESS AND FIRST AMENDMENT - CY PRES SETTLEMENTS, FRANK V. GAOS, U.S. SUPREME COURT - CY PRES SETTLEMENTS - DECIDED MARCH 19, 2019 |
| FORM 990, PART III, LINE 4A | THREE NAMED PLAINTIFFS BROUGHT CLASS ACTION CLAIMS AGAINST GOOGLE FOR ALLEGED VIOLATIONS OF THE STORED COMMUNICATIONS ACT, AMONG OTHER CLAIMS. ULTIMATELY, THE PARTIES NEGOTIATED A SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT THAT WOULD REQUIRE GOOGLE TO INCLUDE CERTAIN DISCLOSURES ON SOME OF ITS WEBPAGES AND WOULD DISTRIBUTE MORE THAN $5 MILLION TO CY PRES RECIPIENTS, MORE THAN $2 MILLION TO CLASS COUNSEL, AND NO MONEY TO ABSENT CLASS MEMBERS. PETITIONERS ARE CLASS MEMBERS WHO OBJECTED TO THE SETTLEMENT, ARGUING THAT CY PRESS ONLY RELIEF DOES NOT COMPLY WITH THE REQUIREMENTS OF FED. RULE CIV. PROC. 23(E) AND WAS NOT JUSTIFIED UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES. THE DISTRICT COURT NEVERTHELESS GRANTED FINAL APPROVAL OF THE SETTLEMENT, AND THE NINTH CIRCUIT AFFIRMED. CY PRES SETTLEMENTS OF CLASS ACTIONS HAVE BECOME AN "EASY" WAY FOR THE PARTIES TO SETTLE A CASE, WHILE "MAKING EVERYONE HAPPY." IN THE TYPICAL CY PRES CASE, ONLY A SMALL PORTION OF THE SETTLEMENT FUND INVOLVES CLAIMS BY ACTUAL CLASS MEMBERS OR FUNDS THAT CAN'T BE DISTRIBUTED BECAUSE THE CLASS MEMBERS ENTITLED TO PAYMENT CANNOT BE LOCATED. IN SUCH INSTANCES THE "TAIL" OF THE SETTLEMENT FUND IS DISTRIBUTED TO ONE OR MORE CHARITABLE ORGANIZATIONS THAT HAVE SOME TENUOUS RELATIONSHIP TO THE SUBJECT MATTER OF THE CASE. IN NUMEROUS INSTANCES, THE RECIPIENT IS A COLLEGE OR LAW SCHOOL THAT HAPPENS TO BE THE ALMA MATER OF THE PLAINTIFF CLASS'S LAWYER(S), THE DEFENDANTS' LAWYER(S), AND/OR THE JUDGE. ALL THE LAWYERS COME OUT LOOKING GENEROUS AND PHILANTHROPIC (WITH OTHER PEOPLE'S MONEY); BUT AT LEAST THE PLAINTIFF CLASS COLLECTIVELY GETS A SUBSTANTIAL PAYOUT. IN THIS CASE, THE ACTUAL INJURED PARTY GOT NOTHING, NOT EVEN A COUPON TO GET A DISCOUNT ON SOME FUTURE PURCHASE FROM THE WRONG-DOER. ATLANTIC LEGAL AND THE CENTER FOR CONSTITUTIONAL LITIGATION OF THE CLAREMONT INSTITUTE JOINTLY FILED AN AMICUS BRIEF IN THE U.S. SUPREME COURT, IN SUPPORT OF PETITIONERS IN FRANK V. GAOS. IN THEIR MERITS STAGE CHALLENGE TO THE APPROVAL BY THE LOWER FEDERAL COURTS, INCLUDING THE NINTH CIRCUIT, OF A CY PRES AWARD SETTLEMENT OF A CLASS ACTION THAT PROVIDED THAT THE WHOLE OF THE SETTLEMENT FUND (NET OF ATTORNEYS' FEES AND ADMINISTRATION COSTS) WAS TO BE PAID TO ADVOCACY GROUPS; NOT A PENNY WAS PAID TO MEMBERS OF THE CLASS, WHICH CONSISTED OF 130 MILLION USERS OF GOOGLE, WHOSE PRIVACY WAS VIOLATED. WE ARGUE THAT THE CY PRES ONLY SETTLEMENT ALSO VIOLATES THE FIRST AMENDMENT RIGHTS OF THE UNNAMED CLASS MEMBERS. BY DIRECTING THE SETTLEMENT FUNDS AWAY FROM MEMBERS OF THE INJURED PLAINTIFF CLASS TO ADVOCACY GROUPS SUCH AS AARP, INC. AND THE WORLD PRIVACY FORUM, THE COURTS BELOW FORCED THE PLAINTIFF CLASS TO PROVIDE FINANCIAL SUPPORT TO ORGANIZATIONS WITH WHICH THEY MAY NOT AGREE, IN VIOLATION OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT'S PROHIBITION ON COMPELLED SPEECH. COMPELLING THE PLAINTIFF CLASS TO SUBSIDIZE THE SPEECH OF OTHERS RAISES SIMILAR CONCERNS TO COMPELLED SPEECH, JANUS V. AFSCME, 138 S. CT. AT 2464 (2018), DECIDED AT THE END OF OCTOBER 2017 TERM OF THE COURT, AND COMPELLING INDIVIDUALS TO SPEAK A PARTICULAR MESSAGE "VIOLATES [A] CARDINAL CONSTITUTIONAL COMMAND," ID.; SEE NIFLA V. BECERRA, 585 U.S. 138 S.CT. 2361 (2018). WE ALSO ARGUED THAT THE CLASS MEMBERS HAVE NO STANDING BECAUSE THE INDIVIDUALS WHO ALLEGEDLY SUFFERED HARM RECEIVED NO RELIEF AND ARE BARRED FROM SEEKING RELIEF FROM SIMILAR CONDUCT IN THE FUTURE; THUS THE COURT CANNOT REDRESS THE ALLEGED INJURY, FURTHER, THE CY PRES AWARD RECIPIENTS IN THIS CASE HAVE NO STANDING BECAUSE IN FACT THEY HAVE NOT SUFFERED ANY INJURY AND CONSEQUENTLY THE "CASE OR CONTROVERSY" REQUIREMENTS OF ARTICLE III HAVE NOT BEEN MET. THE SUPREME COURT, AGREEING WITH AN ARGUMENT WE MADE, HELD THAT THE LOWER COURTS DID NOT ADDRESS THE COURT'S OPINION IN SPOKEO, INC. V. ROBINS (2016), WHICH WAS ISSUED AFTER BRIEFING IN THE CASE WAS COMPLETE BUT PRIOR TO THE NINTH CIRCUIT'S DECISION. THE COURT DETERMINED THAT THERE WERE SUBSTANTIAL QUESTIONS ABOUT WHETHER ANY OF THE NAMED PLAINTIFFS HAS STANDING TO SUE IN LIGHT SPOKEO. BECAUSE THE COURT IS ONE "OF REVIEW, NOT OF FIRST VIEW," IN A PER CURIAM OPINION THE COURT VACATED THE DECISION OF THE NINTH CIRCUIT APPROVING A CY PRES ONLY CLASS ACTION SETTLEMENT AND REMANDED THE CASE FOR THE RESOLUTION OF THESE QUESTIONS. JUSTICE THOMAS, IN DISSENT, WOULD HAVE REACHED THE MERITS AND WOULD HAVE REVERSED THE NINTH CIRCUIT'S CLASS CERTIFICATION AND CLASS SETTLEMENT ORDERS BECAUSE THE CLASS MEMBERS RECEIVED NO DAMAGES OR OTHER FORM OF MEANINGFUL RELIEF. ALTHOUGH THE COURT PUNTED ON DECIDING THE FAIRNESS OF GOOGLE'S $8.5 MILLION CY PRES PRIVACY DEAL THAT STEERED FUNDS TO THIRD PARTIES INSTEAD OF CLASS MEMBERS, JUSTICE THOMAS' UNEQUIVOCAL CRITICISM OF THE ARRANGEMENT MAY BE A SIGN THAT THE HIGH COURT MAY SOON CURTAIL THE PRACTICE. ARBITRATION AGREEMENTS HENRY SCHEIN, INC., ET AL. V. ARCHER AND WHITE SALES, INC. MERITS. DECIDED JANUARY 8, 2019 JURISDICTION TO DECIDE "THRESHOLD ISSUES." JUSTICE KAVANAUGH, WRITING FOR A UNANIMOUS COURT IN HIS FIRST OPINION, REJECTED AN ASSERTED VAGUE EXCEPTION LIMITING ENFORCEMENT OF ARBITRATION AGREEMENTS IN HENRY SCHEIN INC. V. ARCHER & WHITE SALES INC. THE CASE IS THE MOST RECENT IN A DECADE LONG STRING OF OPINIONS UNDER THE FEDERAL ARBITRATION ACT, IN WHICH THE SUPREME COURT HAS CONSISTENTLY REVERSED LOWER COURT DECISIONS REFUSING TO ENFORCE ARBITRATION AGREEMENTS. MANY OF THOSE CASES HAVE BEEN DECIDED BY NARROW 5 4 MAJORITIES, WHICH HAS RAISED THE POSSIBILITY THAT THE REPLACEMENT OF JUSTICE ANTHONY KENNEDY MIGHT LEAD TO SOME SOFTENING OF THE COURT'S POSITION IN THOSE CASES. IN FACT, HENRY SCHEIN INDICATES THAT EVEN THE JUSTICES MORE SKEPTICAL ABOUT ARBITRATION SAW NO MERIT IN THE ARGUMENTS AGAINST ARBITRATION HERE. THE ISSUE IN THIS CASE IS THE ARBITRABILITY OF "GATEWAY" QUESTIONS WHETHER THE UNDERLYING DISPUTE (DID THE DISTRIBUTOR BREACH A CONTRACT), IS ARBITRABLE. AT BOTTOM, THE QUESTION IS WHETHER A COURT OR AN ARBITRATOR DECIDES WHETHER AN ARBITRATION AGREEMENT GOVERNS A PARTICULAR DISPUTE. THE SUPREME COURT REPEATEDLY HAS HELD THAT THE FEDERAL ARBITRATION ACT ALLOWS THE PARTIES TO A CONTRACT TO DECIDE WHETHER AN ARBITRATION AGREEMENT WILL EXTEND TO THOSE GATEWAY QUESTIONS, EXPLAINING THAT COURTS MUST COMPEL ARBITRATION OF THE GATEWAY QUESTIONS WHENEVER THE AGREEMENT INCLUDES "CLEAR AND UNMISTAKABLE EVIDENCE" THAT THE PARTIES DELEGATED THE DECISION OF THOSE QUESTIONS TO THE ARBITRATOR. SEVERAL LOWER COURTS, HOWEVER, HAVE ADOPTED AN EXCEPTION TO THAT RULE, REASONING THAT IT WOULD BE A WASTE OF TIME TO SEND A CASE TO AN ARBITRATOR IF THE CLAIM OF ARBITRABILITY IS "WHOLLY GROUNDLESS." IN THIS CASE, FOR EXAMPLE, THE CONTRACT CALLED FOR ARBITRATION OF ANY "DISPUTE ARISING UNDER OR RELATED TO" THE CONTRACT "EXCEPT FOR ACTIONS SEEKING INJUNCTIVE RELIEF." BECAUSE THE COMPLAINT SOUGHT INJUNCTIVE RELIEF IN ADDITION TO DAMAGES, THE COURTS BELOW REASONED THAT BECAUSE THE DEFENDANT'S REQUEST FOR ARBITRATION WAS WHOLLY GROUNDLESS IT WOULD REFUSE TO COMPEL ARBITRATION. NONE OF THE JUSTICES ACCEPTED THAT APPROACH. KAVANAUGH'S OPINION WAS SUCCINCT AND METHODICAL. HE STARTED FROM THE SUPREME COURT'S REPEATED DECISIONS HOLDING THAT THE "AGREEMENT TO ARBITRATE A GATEWAY ISSUE IS SIMPLY AN ADDITIONAL AGREEMENT THE PARTY SEEKING ARBITRATION ASKS THE FEDERAL COURT TO ENFORCE, AND THE [FEDERAL ARBITRATION ACT] OPERATES ON THIS ADDITIONAL ARBITRATION AGREEMENT JUST AS IT DOES ON ANY OTHER." HE THEN POINTED OUT THE COURT'S FREQUENT REJECTION OF THE IDEA THAT A COURT SHOULD USE A CLAIM OF FRIVOLITY AS A BASIS FOR REJECTING ENFORCEMENT OF AN ARBITRATION AGREEMENT, QUOTING EARLIER DECISIONS EXPLAINING THAT COURTS HAVE "NO BUSINESS WEIGHING THE MERITS OF THE GRIEVANCE," BECAUSE THE "AGREEMENT IS TO SUBMIT ALL GRIEVANCES TO ARBITRATION, NOT MERELY THOSE WHICH THE COURT WILL DEEM MERITORIOUS." JUSTICE KAVANAUGH DISMISSED THE NOTION THAT AN EXCEPTION VITIATING "WHOLLY GROUNDLESS" REQUESTS FOR ARBITRATION "WOULD SAVE TIME AND MONEY SYSTEMICALLY." AMONG OTHER THINGS, HE SUGGESTED, SUCH AN "EXCEPTION WOULD INEVITABLY SPARK COLLATERAL LITIGATION (WITH BRIEFING, ARGUMENT, AND OPINION WRITING) OVER WHETHER A SEEMINGLY UNMERITORIOUS ARGUMENT FOR ARBITRATION IS WHOLLY GROUNDLESS, AS OPPOSED TO GROUNDLESS. WE SEE NO REASON TO CREATE SUCH A TIME CONSUMING SIDESHOW." PERHAPS IT DID NOT ESCAPE THE NOTICE OF THE JUSTICES THAT THE LITIGATION OVER ARBITRABILITY IN THIS CASE HAS CONSUMED SEVEN YEARS: ARBITRATION MIGHT HAVE BEEN A WASTE OF TIME, BUT WOULD IT HAVE WASTED SEVEN YEARS? AS THE ARGUMENT MADE CLEAR, NONE OF THE JUSTICES SAW ANY MERIT IN A PROCESS CALLING FOR COLLATERAL LITIGATION OVER THE GATEWAY QUESTION OF ARBITRABILITY. |
| FORM 990, PART III, LINE 4A | WINSTON & STRAWN, LLP V. RAMOS, U. S. SUPREME COURT, PETITION STAGE STATE RULES LIMITING ARBITRATION IN JUNE 2019 ATLANTIC LEGAL FILED AN AMICUS BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF WINSTON & STRAWN'S PETITION FOR CERTIORARI IN THIS CASE, WHICH CONCERNS THE ENFORCEABILITY OF AN ARBITRATION AGREEMENT BETWEEN A NATIONAL LAW FIRM AND ONE OF ITS FORMER PARTNERS. WORK ON THIS CASE BEGAN AT THE END OF 2018. THE CALIFORNIA COURT OF APPEAL'S DECISION TO STRIKE THE ARBITRATION PROVISION DISREGARDS FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES OF THE FEDERAL ARBITRATION ACT (FAA) AS CONSTRUED BY THE U.S. SUPREME COURT IN A SERIES OF CASES, IN SEVERAL OF WHICH WE HAVE PARTICIPATED. IF NOT CORRECTED, THE CALIFORNIA COURT'S ERROR WILL SIGNIFICANTLY WEAKEN THE ABILITY OF ALL EMPLOYERS INCLUDING LAW FIRMS AND OTHER PROFESSIONAL SERVICE ORGANIZATIONS TO RESOLVE EMPLOYMENT RELATED DISPUTES THROUGH ARBITRATION. THE PETITION ASKS THE SUPREME COURT TO CORRECT YET ANOTHER ATTEMPT BY THE CALIFORNIA COURTS TO DISFAVOR ARBITRATION AGREEMENTS IN VIOLATION OF THE FAA AND SUPREME COURT PRECEDENT. IN PARTICULAR, THE QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOCUS ON WHETHER CALIFORNIA'S UNIQUE PROCEDURAL HURDLES FOR ARBITRATING STATUTORY EMPLOYMENT LAW CLAIMS, AS WELL AS CALIFORNIA'S ARBITRATION SPECIFIC APPROACH TO SEVERABILITY, ARE PREEMPTED BY THE FAA UNDER AT&T MOBILITY LLC V. CONCEPCION, 563 U.S. 333 (2011), AND SIMILAR CASES. CALIFORNIA COURTS HAVE DEVELOPED A HIGHLY RESTRICTIVE APPROACH TO ENFORCING ARBITRATION AGREEMENTS RESPECTING STATE STATUTORY CLAIMS. SEE ARMENDARIZ V. FOUND. PSYCH HEALTHCARE, 24 CAL. 4TH 83, 113 21 (2000) (SETTING FORTH FIVE "MINIMUM REQUIREMENTS FOR THE LAWFUL ARBITRATION OF SUCH RIGHTS, AND INVOKING "UNCONSCIONABILITY" DOCTRINE TO STRIKE ARBITRATION PROVISIONS THAT ARE "UNFAIRLY ONE SIDED"). ALTHOUGH ARMENDARIZ WAS DECIDED BEFORE CONCEPCION, THE CALIFORNIA COURT OF APPEAL HAS CONTINUED TO IMPOSE ARBITRATION SPECIFIC OBSTACLES TO THE ENFORCEMENT OF ARBITRATION PROVISIONS IN EMPLOYMENT CONTEXTS, AND THE CALIFORNIA SUPREME COURT HAS DECLINED TO CORRECT THAT ERROR. SEE, E.G., SANCHEZ V. VALENCIA HOLDING CO., LLC, 61 CAL. 4TH 899 (2015); SONIC CALABASAS A, INC. V. MORENO, 57 CAL. 4TH 1109 (2013). IN ADDITION, THE SEVERABILITY RULE APPLIED BY CALIFORNIA COURTS IS ITSELF UNIQUELY HOSTILE TO ARBITRATION CONTRACTS. CALIFORNIA COURTS WILL INVALIDATE AN ENTIRE AGREEMENT TO ARBITRATE BASED ONLY UPON THE PRESENCE OF MORE THAN ONE UNCONSCIONABLE TERM. SEE ARMENDARIZ, 24 CAL. 4TH AT 121 27. NO SUCH RULE APPLIES TO CONTRACTS GENERALLY IN CALIFORNIA. CALIFORNIA'S APPROACH TO SEVERABILITY UNIQUELY DISFAVORS ARBITRATION AGREEMENTS CONTRARY TO THE MANDATE OF THE FAA. THE OTHER QUESTION - WHETHER CALIFORNIA'S ARMENDARIZ "MINIMUM REQUIREMENTS AND ARBITRATION SPECIFIC UNCONSCIONABILITY DOCTRINE SURVIVE FAA PREEMPTION RAISES AN ISSUE ON WHICH THE SUPREME COURT HAS RECENTLY AND REPEATEDLY FOCUSED ITS ATTENTION. THE COURT HAS RECENTLY GRANTED SEVERAL PETITIONS CHALLENGING STATE COURTS' REFUSAL TO HEED FAA PREEMPTION. SEE KINDRED NURSING CTRS. LTD. P'SHIP V. CLARK, 137 S. CT. 1421 (2017); NITRO LIFT TECHS., L.L.C. V. HOWARD, 568 U.S. 17 (2012); MARMET HEALTH CARE CTR., INC. V. BROWN, 565 U.S. 530 (2012); KPMG LLP V. COCCHI 565 U.S. 18 (2011). CALIFORNIA COURTS IN PARTICULAR HAVE PRODUCED A DISPROPORTIONATE NUMBER OF THESE ARBITRATION HOSTILE DECISIONS, MAKING THIS ISSUE A STRONG CANDIDATE FOR REVERSAL. SEE, E.G., DIRECTV, INC. V. IMBURGIA, 136 S. CT. 463 (2015); PRESTON V. FERRER, 552 U.S. 346 (2008). RESPONDENT HAS ASKED FOR AND HAS BEEN GRANTED ADDITIONAL TIME TO FILE HER RESPONSE, AND THE PETITION IS SUB JUDICE. ALTHOUGH THE CERTIORARI PROCESS IS INHERENTLY UNPREDICTABLE, WE THINK THERE IS A REASONABLE CHANCE THE SUPREME COURT WILL GRANT REVIEW IN THIS CASE. FOR ONE THING, THE COURT RECENTLY GRANTED CERTIORARI IN MHN GOVERNMENT SERVICES, INC. V. ZABOROWSKI, WHICH RAISED THE QUESTION OF WHETHER CALIFORNIA'S ARBITRATION ONLY SEVERABILITY RULE IS PREEMPTED BY THE FAA; THE COURT DID NOT DECIDE THE QUESTION BECAUSE THE CASE SETTLED IN APRIL 2016, BEFORE ORAL ARGUMENT WAS HELD. SEE 136 S. CT. 1539 (2016). THERE IS NO REASON TO THINK THAT QUESTION HAS BECOME ANY LESS "CERT-WORTHY" OVER THE PAST THREE YEARS (THE ISSUE HAS NOT BEEN SQUARELY PRESENTED SINCE MHN BECAME MOOT). SEPARATION OF POWERS - JUDICIAL DEFERENCE TO ADMINISTRATIVE INTERPRETATION. KISOR V. WILKIE - U.S. SUPREME COURT. MERITS. DECIDED JUNE 26, 2019. KISOR V. WILKIE, IS A VETERAN'S BENEFIT CASE INVOLVING A U. S. MARINE WHO SOUGHT RETROACTIVE BENEFITS FOR HIS SERVICE-RELATED PTSD. THE CASE HINGED ON THE VETERANS ADMINISTRATION'S INTERPRETATION OF THE APPLICABLE FEDERAL REGULATIONS. THE COURT GRANTED REVIEW OF THE QUESTION WHETHER THE COURT SHOULD OVERRULE AUER V. ROBBINS AND BOWLES V. SEMINOLE ROCK AND SAND CO. AUER AND SEMINOLE ROCK "DIRECT COURTS TO DEFER TO AN AGENCY'S REASONABLE INTERPRETATION OF ITS OWN AMBIGUOUS REGULATION." "AUER DEFERENCE AND "CHEVRON DEFERENCE" ARE FOUNDATIONS OF THE EXPLOSIVE GROWTH IN THE POWER OF EXECUTIVE BRANCH AGENCIES. ATLANTIC LEGAL BEGAN WORKING ON THIS CASE IN LATE DECEMBER 2018, AND WE FILED OUR BRIEF IN LATE JANUARY 2019. THE CASE WAS DECIDED AT THE END OF THE COURT'S TERM IN JUNE 2019. THE CORE HOLDING OF CHEVRON IS THAT WHEN A COURT CONFRONTS AN EXECUTIVE AGENCY'S "CONSTRUCTION OF THE STATUTE WHICH IT ADMINISTERS," THEN IT WILL DEFER TO THE AGENCY SO LONG AS CONGRESS HASN'T "DIRECTLY SPOKEN" TO THE ISSUE AND THE AGENCY HAS ENGAGED IN A "PERMISSIBLE CONSTRUCTION" OF THE STATUTE. AUER REQUIRES COURTS TO DEFER TO THE AGENCY WHEN THE AGENCY'S OWN REGULATION IS AMBIGUOUS. THE RESULT IS A REGIME OF DEFERENCE UPON DEFERENCE THAT GIVES REGULATORY AGENCIES ENORMOUS AUTHORITY TO CRAFT AND THEN INTERPRET THEIR OWN REGULATIONS AND GIVES AGENCIES AN INCENTIVE TO ISSUE AMBIGUOUS RULES. THIS DEFERENCE PERMITS EXECUTIVE BRANCH AGENCIES TO EXPAND THEIR CONSTITUTIONAL ROLE AND ESSENTIALLY COMBINE ALL THREE CONSTITUTIONAL FUNCTIONS IN A SINGLE BUREAUCRATIC AGENCY WHICH IS THE LAWMAKER THAT DRAFTS REGULATIONS, THE JUDGE THAT INTERPRETS ITS OWN LAWS, AND THE EXECUTIVE THAT ENFORCES THE LAWS THAT IT HAS DRAFTED AND INTERPRETED. UNDER CHEVRON THE PEOPLE ARE REQUIRED TO GUESS WHETHER THE STATUTE WILL BE DECLARED "AMBIGUOUS" (COURTS OFTEN DISAGREE ON WHAT QUALIFIES); AND REQUIRED TO GUESS WHETHER AN AGENCY'S INTERPRETATION WILL BE DEEMED "REASONABLE." EVEN IF THE PEOPLE SOMEHOW MANAGE TO GUESS CORRECTLY, THEY MUST REMAIN ALERT TO THE POSSIBILITY THAT THE AGENCY WILL REVERSE ITS CURRENT VIEW BASED MERELY ON THE SHIFT OF POLITICAL WINDS. THE AUER DOCTRINE AMPLIFIES ALL OF THE CHEVRON PROBLEMS. UNDER AUER, THERE ARE ACTUAL ADVANTAGES IN DRAFTING BROAD AND VAGUE REGULATIONS: THEY GIVE REGULATORS MAXIMUM FLEXIBILITY, BUT FOR THE REGULATED COMMUNITY THEY CREATE LEGAL UNCERTAINTY. ATLANTIC LEGAL AND OTHER AMICI URGED THE SUPREME COURT TO RECONSIDER FEDERAL AGENCY DEFERENCE DOCTRINES, INCLUDING CHEVRON V. NATURAL RESOURCES DEFENSE COUNCIL AND AUER V. ROBBINS. THE APPLICATION OF THESE DOCTRINES VIOLATES FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES OF SEPARATION OF POWERS, DUE PROCESS AND FEDERALISM BY PERMITTING UNELECTED FEDERAL BUREAUCRATS TO PRE EMPT STATE LAWS, OUTSIDE THE PROCESS PRESCRIBED BY THE U.S. CONSTITUTION. THESE DOCTRINES UNDERMINE THE SEPARATION OF POWERS BY GRANTING BINDING INTERPRETIVE AUTHORITY TO THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH. THOUGH KISOR'S PLURALITY OPINION ASSERTS THAT AUER DEFERENCE PROMOTES DEMOCRATIC ACCOUNTABILITY BY GRANTING TO EXECUTIVE BRANCH OFFICIALS, INSTEAD OF ARTICLE III JUDGES, FINAL AUTHORITY OVER THE MEANING OF AMBIGUOUS REGULATIONS, THE OPPOSITE IS TRUE. SEPARATION OF POWERS NOT THE FEDERAL BUREAUCRACY PROVIDES THE FUNDAMENTAL SAFEGUARD FOR BOTH DEMOCRATIC ACCOUNTABILITY AND INDIVIDUAL LIBERTY. IN A FRACTURED 5-4 OPINION, THE COURT MISSED A CHANCE TO RESTORE THE ROLE OF FEDERALISM AND THE SEPARATION OF POWERS IN FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE LAW. WHILE THE KISOR MAJORITY SOUGHT TO "REINFORCE THE LIMITS AND "CABIN [] THE SCOPE" OF AUER DEFERENCE TO MAKE IT MORE RESPECTFUL OF THESE FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES, AND ALL JUSTICES EXPRESSED THE BELIEF THAT AUER NOW MEANS A LOT LESS THAN IT DID BEFORE. BUT THE CURE FOR AUER'S OVERREACH MAY TURN OUT TO BE ALMOST AS BAD AS THE DISEASE. THE MAJORITY LIMITS AUER BY ARTICULATING A SERIES OF EXCEPTIONS THAT ARE THEMSELVES AMBIGUOUS. "WHETHER TO APPLY [AUER] DEPENDS ON A RANGE OF CONSIDERATIONS, AND "THE LIMITS OF AUER DEFERENCE ARE NOT SUSCEPTIBLE TO ANY RIGID TEST." IN DETERMINING WHETHER AUER APPLIES AT ALL, A COURT MUST CONSIDER "THE CHARACTER AND CONTEXT OF THE AGENCY INTERPRETATION." THIS INQUIRY "DOES NOT REDUCE TO ANY EXHAUSTIVE TEST," BUT DOES RELY ON "SOME ESPECIALLY IMPORTANT MARKERS." THESE "MARKERS AND THE EXCEPTIONS IS LIKELY TO GENERATE VOLUMINOUS "THRESHOLD" LITIGATION OVER WHETHER AUER APPLIES AT ALL, SIMILAR TO THE "THRESHOLD" LITIGATION THAT ALREADY BEDEVILS THE APPLICATION OF CHEVRON DEFERENCE. |
| FORM 990, PART III, LINE 4A | THE KISOR MAJORITY'S FAILURE TO FULLY RESPECT PRINCIPLES OF SEPARATION OF POWERS, CONSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE AND DEMOCRATIC ACCOUNTABILITY IS DISAPPOINTING, BUT, HOPEFULLY JUST THE BEGINNING OF EFFORTS TO LIMIT BUREAUCRATIC POWER. ATLANTIC LEGAL FOUNDATION FILED AN AMICUS BRIEF ON THE MERITS URGING THE U.S. SUPREME COURT TO OVERTURN AUER V. ROBBINS, A PRECEDENT THAT, WE ARGUE, VIOLATES THE SEPARATION OF POWERS BY REQUIRING THE JUDICIARY TO TREAT AS BINDING THE EXECUTIVE'S INTERPRETATIONS OF ITS OWN REGULATIONS. WE URGED THE COURT TO OVERTURN AUER AND RESTORE THE SEPARATION OF POWERS UNDER WHICH IT IS "THE DUTY OF THE JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT TO SAY WHAT THE LAW IS." MARBURY V. MADISON, 1 CRANCH 137, 177 (1803). DESPITE ITS SHORTCOMINGS, KISOR MAY BE ONE OF THE MOST SIGNIFICANT CASES OF THE COURT'S MOST RECENT TERM. SOUND SCIENCE - ADMISSIBILITY OF EXPERT EVIDENCE -PROOF OF MEDICAL CAUSATION JUNI V. A.O.. SMITH WATER PRODUCTS, NEW YORK COURT OF APPEALS, ASBESTOS. BURDEN OF PROOF. "CUMULATIVE EXPOSURE" THEORY. COURTS HAVE LONG TRIED TO MANAGE ASBESTOS DOCKETS SWOLLEN WITH CLAIMANTS ALLEGING THEY HAVE ASBESTOSIS, LUNG CANCER OR MESOTHELIOMA. EARLY ASBESTOS LAWSUITS TARGETED PRODUCERS OF ASBESTOS AND ASBESTOS CONTAINING PRODUCTS, WHICH NUMBERED IN THE HUNDREDS (IN 1982, ABOUT 300 SUCH COMPANIES). HOWEVER, AS THESE DEFENDANTS DECLARED BANKRUPTCY (AND THE DIRECT PRODUCERS ESTABLISHED "TRUST FUNDS" TO COMPENSATE VICTIMS), WAVES OF NEW LAWSUITS SPREAD TO COMPANIES FARTHER REMOVED FROM DIRECT PRODUCTION. THE MOST COMMON "DEEP POCKET" DEFENDANTS ARE MANUFACTURERS OF MACHINERY THAT USED ASBESTOS AS INSULATING, GASKET OR "FRICTION" MATERIAL (SUCH AS AUTOMOBILE BRAKES AND CLUTCHES) OR CONSTRUCTION MATERIAL THAT USED MATERIALS THAT HAD AN INCIDENTAL AMOUNT OF ASBESTOS (SUCH AS WALL BOARD, JOINT COMPOUND, CEMENT BLOCKS, PLASTER, ETC.). NEW YORK COUNTY SUPREME COURT (NEW YORK STATE'S TRIAL COURT OF GENERAL JURISDICTION) IN JUNI V. A.O. SMITH WATER PRODUCTS SET ASIDE A JURY VERDICT TOTALING $11 MILLION AWARDED AGAINST FORD MOTOR COMPANY IN FAVOR OF A MOTOR VEHICLE MECHANIC WHO HAD DIED FROM MESOTHELIOMA. THE TRIAL COURT'S OPINION IS A THOROUGH AND CLEAR EXPLICATION OF THE CLASH BETWEEN EXPERTS' HYPOTHESES, AND "GOOD" SCIENCE. IT EXPOSED THE TENSIONS BETWEEN WHAT THE PLAINTIFF'S EXPERTS CLAIMED AND WHAT NEW YORK'S LEGAL STANDARDS REQUIRE FOR RELIABLE AND ADMISSIBLE EXPERT TESTIMONY. THE TRIAL COURT REJECTED" THE "SINGLE FIBER" THEORY, WHICH IS BASED ON THE NOTION THAT A "SINGLE FIBER" OF ANY TYPE OF ASBESTOS CAUSES DISEASE CUMULATIVELY AND, THEREFORE, IS A "SUBSTANTIAL FACTOR" IN CAUSING THE DISEASE. SINGLE FIBER TESTIMONY HAS BEEN REJECTED BY A GROWING NUMBER OF APPELLATE COURTS OUTSIDE NEW YORK. THE TRIAL COURT ANALYZED PLAINTIFF'S EXPERT TESTIMONY AND HELD THAT THE RELIABILITY OF THESE OPINIONS AND THE UNDERLYING METHODOLOGIES WERE GOVERNED BY THE ADMISSIBILITY STANDARDS ARTICULATED IN PARKER V. MOBIL OIL CORP. AND CORNELL V. 360 W. 51ST ST. REALTY. IF "NOVEL" SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE IS INVOLVED, THE COURT APPLIES THE "GENERAL ACCEPTANCE" TEST ARTICULATED IN FRYE V. UNITED STATES (D.C. CIR. 1924) TO DETERMINE "WHETHER THE ACCEPTED TECHNIQUES, WHEN PROPERLY PERFORMED, GENERATE RESULTS ACCEPTED AS RELIABLE WITHIN THE SCIENTIFIC COMMUNITY GENERALLY." IF THE ANSWER IS "NO," THE TESTIMONY MUST BE EXCLUDED. IF THE ANSWER IS "YES," THE PROPONENT OF THE NOVEL SCIENTIFIC TESTIMONY HAS SURVIVED THE THRESHOLD TEST BUT STILL HAS TO GET PAST THE ADMISSIBILITY "GATE AND THE PROFFERED SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE MUST THEN MEET A SECOND, "FOUNDATIONAL RELIABILITY" INQUIRY. THIS SECOND ADMISSIBILITY STANDARD APPLIES TO ALL EXPERT TESTIMONY, NOT JUST NOVEL SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE. IN PARKER, THE COURT SAID THE FRYE INQUIRY IS "SEPARATE AND DISTINCT FROM THE ADMISSIBILITY QUESTION APPLIED TO ALL EVIDENCE WHETHER THERE IS A PROPER FOUNDATION TO DETERMINE WHETHER THE ACCEPTED METHODS WERE APPROPRIATELY EMPLOYED IN A PARTICULAR CASE." PARKER DECLARED THAT THE FOCUS MOVES "FROM THE GENERAL RELIABILITY CONCERNS OF FRYE TO THE SPECIFIC RELIABILITY OF THE PROCEDURES FOLLOWED TO GENERATE THE EVIDENCE PROFFERED AND WHETHER THEY ESTABLISH A FOUNDATION FOR THE RECEPTION OF EVIDENCE AT TRIAL." PLAINTIFF'S GENERAL CAUSATION EXPERT TESTIFIED THAT ALL INSTANCES OF ASBESTOS EXPOSURE ARE "VIEWED AS A WHOLE," CUMULATIVELY CONTRIBUTING TO AND CAUSING THE ILLNESS. HE STATED THAT "EVERY PART OF THAT EXPOSURE" ACTS AS A CONTRIBUTING FACTOR AND NO EXPOSURE CAN BE DISCOUNTED, NO MATTER HOW REMOTE THE OCCURRENCE, AS "IT'S THE CUMULATIVE EXPOSURE THAT MATTERS." HE ALSO OPINED THAT CHRYSOTILE FIBERS IN FRICTION PRODUCTS (E.G., BRAKES, CLUTCHES AND GASKETS) CAN CAUSE MESOTHELIOMA. MARKOWITZ ACKNOWLEDGED THAT 21 OF 22 EPIDEMIOLOGICAL STUDIES ON WORKERS WITH FRICTION PRODUCTS "YIELDED NO EVIDENCE OF AN INCREASED RISK OF DEVELOPING AN ASBESTOS RELATED DISEASE," BUT HE RELIED ON INDUSTRIAL HYGIENE STUDIES THAT INVOLVED FACTORY WORKERS WHO PRODUCED FRICTION PRODUCTS FROM RAW ASBESTOS. PLAINTIFF'S EXPERT ON SPECIFIC CAUSATION, TESTIFIED THAT DECEDENT'S CUMULATIVE ASBESTOS EXPOSURES CAUSED HIS MESOTHELIOMA; THAT IT IS NOT POSSIBLE TO SEPARATE OUT OR EXCLUDE ANY PARTICULAR EXPOSURE; AND THAT ALL OF JUNI'S ASBESTOS EXPOSURES IN AND AROUND WORK ON BRAKES AND CLUTCHES CONSTITUTED "SUBSTANTIAL CONTRIBUTING FACTORS IN CAUSING HIS DISEASE." THE COURT LISTED THE ITEMS UPON WHICH THE EXPERT BASED HER OPINION. HOWEVER, THE EXPERT CONCEDED THAT SHE DID NOT KNOW THE AMOUNT, DURATION, OR FREQUENCY OF PLAINTIFF'S EXPOSURES TO PRODUCTS WITH ASBESTOS CONTAINING DUST SOLD OR DISTRIBUTED BY DEFENDANT. SHE COULD NOT AND DID NOT ESTABLISH A DOSE RESPONSE RELATIONSHIP OR EVEN MINIMALLY QUANTIFY JUNI'S EXPOSURES. NEW YORK LAW REQUIRES PLAINTIFF TO ESTABLISH SOME QUANTIFIABLE LEVEL OF EXPOSURE. PARKER REQUIRES SUCH QUANTIFICATION. THE "EVERY SINGLE EXPOSURE" ARGUMENT IS IRRECONCILABLE WITH THE WELL-RECOGNIZED SCIENTIFIC REQUIREMENT THAT THE AMOUNT, DURATION AND FREQUENCY OF EXPOSURE BE CONSIDERED IN ASSESSING THE SUFFICIENCY OF AN EXPOSURE TO INCREASE THE RISK OF DEVELOPING A DISEASE. IN PARKER, A SERVICE STATION EMPLOYEE LINKED HIS LEUKEMIA DIAGNOSIS TO EXPOSURE TO BENZENE IN GASOLINE. IN A 2006 DECISION, THE COURT OF APPEALS DECIDED THAT PLAINTIFFS NEEDED TO SHOW EVIDENCE THEY HAD BEEN EXPOSED TO LEVELS OF TOXIN THAT COULD HAVE CAUSED THE DISEASE. IN NOVEMBER 2018 THE NEW YORK COURT OF APPEALS DECIDED THERE WAS INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO ESTABLISH THAT FORD MOTOR CO. CAUSED JUNI'S MESOTHELIOMA, AFFIRMING THE DECISION THAT REVERSED AN $11 MILLION JURY VERDICT HOLDING THE AUTO MANUFACTURER PARTLY LIABLE FOR HIS INJURIES. THE COURT SAID IN A ONE PARAGRAPH MEMORANDUM THAT THE TRIAL COURT'S DECISION TOSSING THE JURY'S VERDICT SHOULD BE UPHELD BASED ON THE EVIDENCE, OR LACK THEREOF, PRESENTED DURING TRIAL: "VIEWING THE EVIDENCE IN THE LIGHT MOST FAVORABLE TO PLAINTIFFS, THE EVIDENCE WAS INSUFFICIENT AS A MATTER OF LAW TO ESTABLISH THAT RESPONDENT FORD MOTOR COMPANY'S CONDUCT WAS A PROXIMATE CAUSE OF THE DECEDENT'S INJURIES PURSUANT TO THE STANDARDS SET FORTH IN PARKER V. MOBIL OIL." ATLANTIC LEGAL FILED A SUBSTANTIAL AND DETAILED AMICUS BRIEF ONE OF ONLY A FEW FILED IN SUPPORT OF FORD. IT IS SOMEWHAT DISAPPOINTING THAT THE COURT OF APPEALS DISPOSED OF JUNI IN SUMMARY FASHION. WE, ALONG WITH THE PLAINTIFFS AND DEFENSE BARS, ANTICIPATED THAT JUNI WOULD BE A WATERSHED CASE. PERHAPS THE COURT VIEWED THE ISSUE AS "ROUTINE" AFTER THE SERIES OF CASES IT HAS DECIDED IN THE LAST SEVERAL YEARS, (PARKER V. MOBIL OIL CORP., 7 N.Y.3D 434 (2006), CORNELL V. 360 W. 51ST ST. REALTY, LLC, 22 N.Y.3D 762 (2014) SEAN R. V. BMW OF N. AM., LLC, 26 N.Y.3D 801 (N.Y. 2016)) IN WHICH THE COURT OF APPEALS HAS (A) CLARIFIED THE STANDARDS FOR A TOXIC TORT PLAINTIFF'S BURDEN AND (B) HAS CLARIFIED THE STANDARDS FOR THE ADMISSIBILITY OF EXPERT EVIDENCE. DELISLE V. CRANE CO. - FLORIDA SUPREME COURT - MERIT - SEPARATION OF POWERS, SOUND SCIENCE. DECIDED OCTOBER 2018. IN DELISLE THE FLORIDA SUPREME COURT REVERSED ITSELF IN A SIGNIFICANT CASE ON THE ADMISSIBILITY OF EXPERT TESTIMONY ON EXPOSURE TO ASBESTOS AND CAUSATION OF MESOTHELIOMA. THIS CASE INVOLVED TWO ISSUES: (1) SEPARATION OF POWERS WHETHER THE LEGISLATURE CAN ENACT A LAW GOVERNING THE ADMISSIBILITY OF EVIDENCE, OR WHETHER THAT INFRINGES THE POWER OF THE JUDICIAL BRANCH; AND (2) WHETHER AN EXPERT'S CAUSATION TESTIMONY BASED ON "CUMULATIVE EXPOSURE" THAT DOES NOT IDENTIFY A SPECIFIC DEFENDANT'S PRODUCT AS THE CAUSE OF THE DISEASE IS CONSISTENT WITH SOUND SCIENCE AND ADMISSIBLE. |
| FORM 990, PART III, LINE 4A | THE FLORIDA SUPREME COURT INITIALLY HELD THAT THE STATE LEGISLATURE'S ADOPTION OF AMENDMENTS TO THE RULES OF EVIDENCE ADOPTING A DAUBERT STANDARD CONTRAVENED THE JUDICIARY'S CONSTITUTIONAL POWER TO DETERMINE JUDICIAL PROCEDURES AND THUS WAS VOID. SUBSEQUENTLY, IN THE SAME CASE IN WHICH ATLANTIC LEGAL FILED AN AMICUS BRIEF ON BEHALF OF SEVERAL PROMINENT SCIENTISTS -- BUT AFTER A CHANGE IN THE COMPOSITION OF THE COURT, THE COURT ITSELF APPROVED THE DAUBERT-LIKE ANALYSIS OF THE ADMISSIBILITY OF EXPERT TESTIMONY WHICH WE HAD ADVOCATED. AS A RESULT, FLORIDA HAS JOINED A GROWING MAJORITY OF STATES THAT HAVE ADOPTED DAUBERT CRITERIA. THIS CASE INVOLVES THE ADMISSIBILITY OF EXPERT TESTIMONY ON CAUSATION OF MESOTHELIOMA AND EXPOSURE TO ASBESTOS. THERE WERE TWO ISSUES: (1) SEPARATION OF POWERS WHETHER THE STATE LEGISLATURE CAN ENACT A LAW GOVERNING THE ADMISSIBILITY OF EVIDENCE, OR WHETHER THAT INFRINGES THE POWER OF THE JUDICIAL BRANCH TO CONTROL LEGAL PROCEEDINGS; AND (2) WHETHER AN EXPERT'S CAUSATION TESTIMONY BASED ON A "CUMULATIVE EXPOSURE" THEORY THAT DOES NOT IDENTIFY A SPECIFIC DEFENDANT'S PRODUCT AS THE CAUSE OF THE DISEASE OR QUANTIFY THE DECEDENT'S EXPOSURE TO ASBESTOS IN DEFENDANT'S PRODUCT IS CONSISTENT WITH SOUND SCIENCE AND ADMISSIBLE. IN LATE 2017, ATLANTIC LEGAL FILED AN AMICUS BRIEF ON BEHALF OF SEVERAL PROMINENT SCIENTISTS WHO ARE EXPERTS IN FIELDS RELEVANT TO MEDICAL CAUSATION. IN THAT BRIEF WE ARGUED THAT THE "CUMULATIVE EXPOSURE" THEORY IS INCONSISTENT WITH APPROPRIATE SCIENTIFIC INQUIRY AS TO MEDICAL CAUSATION, WHICH REQUIRES THAT BOTH "GENERAL CAUSATION" (THAT A PARTICULAR SUBSTANCE CAN CAUSE THE DISEASE WHICH INJURED THE PLAINTIFF) AND "SPECIFIC CAUSATION" (THAT THE INTENSITY, DURATION AND DOSAGE OF THE SUBSTANCE TO WHICH THE PLAINTIFF WAS EXPOSED HAS BEEN SHOWN TO CAUSE THE DISEASE IN QUESTION. THIS IS ESPECIALLY ESSENTIAL WHERE PERSONS ARE EXPOSED TO "BACKGROUND" LEVELS OF THE ACCUSED SUBSTANCE AND WHERE THE PLAINTIFF HAS BEEN EXPOSED TO A PARTICULAR SUBSTANCE FROM MULTIPLE SOURCES. EDUCATION CHOICE ATLANTIC LEGAL FOUNDATION HAS SUPPORTED THE CHARTER SCHOOL COMMUNITY BY PROVIDING LABOR LAW GUIDANCE TO SCHOOL LEADERSHIP THROUGH A SERIES OF BOOKS ENTITLED LEVELING THE PLAYING FIELD. THESE BOOKS ADDRESSED THE PARTICULARLY DIFFICULT AREA OF UNION ORGANIZING, COLLECTIVE BARGAINING, AND RELATED EMPLOYEE RIGHTS AT CHARTER SCHOOLS. THESE ISSUES HAVE HISTORICALLY BEEN DETERMINED BY THE INDIVIDUAL STATES' CHARTER SCHOOL LEGISLATION AND PUBLIC SECTOR LABOR LAW, SINCE ALL CHARTER SCHOOLS ARE PUBLIC SCHOOLS, AS DEFINED BY THE VARIOUS STATE STATUTES. SEVERAL YEARS AGO, WE PUBLISHED A SERIES OF MONOGRAPHS, "LEVELING THE PLAYING FIELD WHAT CHARTER SCHOOL LEADERS SHOULD KNOW ABOUT UNION ORGANIZING" FOR SEVERAL LARGE STATES (CALIFORNIA, MASSACHUSETTS, MICHIGAN, NEW JERSEY, AND NEW YORK). LEVELING THE PLAYING FIELD IS DESIGNED TO ANSWER IMPORTANT QUESTIONS ABOUT THE UNIONIZATION PROCESS, WHAT CHARTER LEADERS MUST DO TO FOSTER POSITIVE LABOR RELATIONS, AND WHERE AND HOW TO SEEK HELP TO IMPROVE OPERATIONAL QUALITY. BECAUSE OF CHANGES IN THE RELEVANT LAW, IN JUNE 2017 WE PUBLISHED A REVISED EDITION OF THE CALIFORNIA STATE-SPECIFIC "LEVELING THE PLAYING FIELD" MONOGRAPH, WHICH WAS PRINTED IN LARGE QUANTITY FOR THE CONTINUING GUIDANCE OF CHARTER SCHOOL LEADERS IN DEALING WITH UNION ORGANIZING OR EFFORTS TO DERAIL CHARTER SCHOOL PROGRESSIVE EDUCATION INITIATIVES AND CHARTER RENEWALS. THE CALIFORNIA CHARTER SCHOOL ASSOCIATION HAS RECOGNIZED OUR FOUNDATION'S GOOD WORK IN THIS REGARD, AS EVIDENCED BY THE ENGAGING PREFACE TO THE THIRD EDITION OF THE"LEVELING THE PLAYING FIELD" PUBLICATION BY THE CCSA'S PRESIDENT AND CEO. THE LEVELING THE PLAYING FIELD PUBLICATION HAS BEEN DISTRIBUTED TO A LARGE NUMBER OF THE 1,200 CHARTER SCHOOLS IN CALIFORNIA. THE CCSA HAS PRAISED THE PUBLICATION FOR ITS USEFUL GUIDANCE TO CHARTER SCHOOL LEADERS. WE ANTICIPATE THAT A REPUBLICAN-APPOINTED MAJORITY OF THE NLRB WILL PERHAPS FOLLOW A DIFFERENT PATH THAN ITS OBAMA ADMINISTRATION PREDECESSOR. THE CURRENT DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION IS MORE CHARTER-FRIENDLY, AND CHARTERS MAY PROLIFERATE, CREATING EVEN GREATER DEMAND FOR LEVELING THE PLAYING FIELD. BECAUSE OF CHANGES IN THE COMPOSITION AND POLICIES OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD AND THE FEDERAL DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, THERE IS A NEED TO UPDATE THE RESPECTIVE STATE-SPECIFIC MONOGRAPHS TO THE SERIES (AND ADD ADDITIONAL STATES). WE HOPE TO PUBLISH NEW EDITIONS OF SEVERAL STATE-SPECIFIC VERSIONS OF LEVELING THE PLAYING FIELD, FOLLOWING THE CALIFORNIA EDITION, TO HIGHLIGHT SIGNIFICANT DEVELOPMENTS IN LABOR LAW AS APPLIED TO CHARTERS. WHEN THE LEVELING SERIES WAS INITIALLY PUBLISHED, IT RAISED THE THEN-THEORETICAL QUESTION OF WHETHER THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS ACT (NLRA), AND NOT STATE LAW, COULD BE DEEMED TO GOVERN CHARTER SCHOOLS, DESPITE THEIR STATES' CHARACTERIZATION AS "PUBLIC SCHOOLS." ALTHOUGH THERE IS VARIATION FROM STATE TO STATE, IN MOST INSTANCES, WHILE CHARTER SCHOOLS ARE FUNDED AND REGULATED BY STATE OR LOCAL GOVERNMENTS, THEY ARE CREATED BY AND ADMINISTERED BY PRIVATE ENTITIES. WE WERE SOMEWHAT PRESCIENT, AS THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD (NLRB) SOON STARTED TO ASSERT FEDERAL LABOR LAW JURISDICTION OVER CHARTER SCHOOLS IN VARIOUS STATES. THERE ARE MANY DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE LABOR LAWS OF THE INDIVIDUAL STATES AND THE NLRA, AND PARTIES IN THESE CASES HAVE THEIR OWN PREFERENCES. IN SOME CASES, UNIONS SOUGHT NLRB JURISDICTION; IN OTHER CASES, EMPLOYERS SOUGHT IT. AS THE NLRB HAS DECIDED THAT CHARTER SCHOOLS IN MORE STATES ARE WITHIN ITS JURISDICTION, INTERESTED PARTIES ON BOTH SIDES HAVE RAISED THEIR CONCERNS. HOWEVER, IT IS CLEAR THAT NO STATE PROVIDES PROTECTIONS AND RIGHTS TO EMPLOYEES AS BROAD AS DOES THE NLRA. LABOR LAW IS INHERENTLY POLITICAL. THE ISSUE OF CHARTER SCHOOLS HAS ALSO BEEN HIGHLY POLITICIZED. THE NLRB BEGAN ITS MARCH TOWARD CHARTER SCHOOL JURISDICTION DURING THE OBAMA YEARS, WHEN DEMOCRATS HELD A MAJORITY OF SEATS ON THE BOARD. IN THOSE YEARS, THE REPUBLICAN MINORITY WERE VOCAL DISSENTERS ON THIS SUBJECT. TO DATE, EITHER THE NLRB, ITS REGIONAL OFFICES, OR ITS ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGES HAVE EXERCISED JURISDICTION OVER CHARTER SCHOOLS IN NEW YORK, CONNECTICUT, PENNSYLVANIA, MICHIGAN, ILLINOIS, CALIFORNIA, ARIZONA, LOUISIANA, MINNESOTA, OHIO, OREGON, TENNESSEE, AND THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA. IN FACT, IN ONLY ONE TEXAS CASE DID THE BOARD DECLINE JURISDICTION DUE TO A GREATER LEVEL OF AUTHORITY OVER THE CHARTER SCHOOL RETAINED BY THE STATE. NOW THAT THE BOARD HAS A REPUBLICAN MAJORITY, THE NLRB IS CONSIDERING EXERCISING ITS VERY RARELY UTILIZED STATUTORY AUTHORITY TO DECLINE JURISDICTION OVER ALL CHARTER SCHOOLS NATIONALLY.A CASE, KIPP ACADEMY CHARTER SCHOOL, NLRB 02-RD-191760, IS PRESENTLY PENDING AT THE BOARD IN WHICH A NEW YORK CHARTER SCHOOL SEEKS FEDERAL JURISDICTION TO SUPPORT ITS EMPLOYEES' NLRB PETITION FOR A DECERTIFICATION VOTE. THE BOARD IS USING THAT CASE AS A FORUM TO DECIDE WHETHER TO WITHDRAW ITS JURISDICTION OVER ALL CHARTER SCHOOLS AN OUTCOME THAT NO PARTY IN THE LITIGATION REQUESTS. THE NLRB ISSUED A CALL FOR AMICI TO FILE BRIEFS. ATLANTIC LEGAL FOUNDATION CONSULTED WITH STATE AND NATIONAL CHARTER SCHOOL GROUPS ON THIS SUBJECT AND DECIDED NOT TO FILE AN AMICUS BRIEF BECAUSE SCHOOLS AND CHARTER SCHOOL ASSOCIATIONS IT SUPPORTS ARE ON BOTH SIDES OF THE MATTER. WHILE THE POTENTIAL IMPACT OF A BOARD DECISION IS MIXED, IT MUST BE NOTED THAT A REJECTION OF JURISDICTION NOW, AFTER THE NLRB HAS DE FACTO GRANTED COVERAGE OF THE LAW TO EMPLOYEES AND THE PARTIES IN SCORES OF CASES NATIONWIDE WOULD BE UNPRECEDENTED AND WOULD IN EFFECT TELL HUNDREDS OF THOUSANDS OF EMPLOYEES THAT THEY NO LONGER HAVE FEDERALLY PROTECTED RIGHTS. |
| FORM 990, PART VI, SECTION B, LINE 11B | ATLANTIC LEGAL HAS ENGAGED AN OUTSIDE ACCOUNTING FIRM TO PREPARE ITS FORM 990. THE DRAFT FORM 990, PREPARED BY THE OUTSIDE ACCOUNTING FIRM, WAS PROVIDED TO THE CHAIRMAN OF THE BOARD AND EACH DIRECTOR BY ELECTRONIC MAIL PRIOR TO FILING WITH THE IRS. EACH DIRECTOR WAS ASKED TO REVIEW THE DRAFT FORM 990 AND PROVIDE COMMENTS OR QUESTIONS. THE OFFICERS OF THE FOUNDATION AND THE FOUNDATION'S BOOKKEEPING CONSULTANT WERE IN FREQUENT COMMUNICATION WITH THE FOUNDATION'S OUTSIDE ACCOUNTANTS AND AUDITORS BY ELECTRONIC MAIL AND TELEPHONE TO PROVIDE INFORMATION, RAISE QUESTIONS AND PROVIDE COMMENTS ON THE FORM 990 PRIOR TO FILING WITH THE IRS. AFTER ALL QUESTIONS AND COMMENTS HAVE BEEN ADDRESSED, THE FINAL FORM 990 IS PREPARED AND SUBMITTED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE FOUNDATION FOR HIS APPROVAL. IT IS THEN FILED WITH THE IRS. |
| FORM 990, PART VI, SECTION B, LINE 12C | THE FOUNDATION'S CONFLICT OF INTEREST POLICY IS SUBMITTED ANNUALLY TO EACH BOARD MEMBER, OFFICER, ADVISOR AND STAFF MEMBER FOR REVIEW AND SIGNATURE. IF IT IS DETERMINED THAT AN ACTUAL CONFLICT EXISTS, THE BOARD MEMBER, OFFICER, ADVISOR OR STAFF MEMBER WILL BE NOTIFIED AND THE MATTER WILL BE INVESTIGATED BY THE CHAIRMAN. NO BOARD MEMBER WILL BE ALLOWED TO VOTE OR PARTICIPATE IN BOARD DISCUSSIONS ABOUT ANY MATTERS INVOLVING THE CONFLICT UNTIL IT IS RESOLVED. |
| FORM 990, PART VI, SECTION B, LINE 15 | THE EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE OF ATLANTIC LEGAL'S BOARD WITHOUT THE PARTICIPATION OF THE PRESIDENT, DETERMINES THE COMPENSATION OF MEMBERS OF THE SENIOR STAFF, I.E., THE PRESIDENT AND THE SENIOR VICE-PRESIDENTS. THE EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE CONSIDERS COMPENSATION LEVELS PAID BY SIMILARLY SITUATED ORGANIZATIONS FOR FUNCTIONALLY COMPARABLE POSITIONS: COMPARABLE SALARIES OF OTHER EMPLOYERS OF LAWYERS IN THE SAME GEOGRAPHICAL MARKET AND NATIONWIDE. THIS PROCESS WAS LAST UNDERTAKEN IN NOVEMBER 2018 AND WAS DOCUMENTED IN THE MINUTES OF THE EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE. |
| FORM 990, PART VI, SECTION C, LINE 19 | THE FOUNDATION MAKES ITS FORM 990 AVAILABLE FOR PUBLIC INSPECTION AS REQUIRED UNDER SECTION 6104 OF THE INTERNAL REVENUE CODE. THE RETURN IS POSTED ON GUIDESTAR.ORG AND OTHER SIMILAR TYPES OF WEBSITES. IN ADDITION, THE FINANCIAL STATEMENTS, ARTICLES OF INCORPORATION, FORM 990, FORM 1023, AND BY-LAWS ARE ALSO AVAILABLE UPON WRITTEN REQUEST OR BY CALLING THE ORGANIZATION DIRECTLY. |
| FORM 990, PART XII, LINE 2C: | THE FOUNDATION IS GOVERNED BY A 27 MEMBER BOARD OF DIRECTORS, 26 OF WHOM ARE INDEPENDENT DIRECTORS. THE INDEPENDENT DIRECTORS SERVE WITHOUT COMPENSATION. THE BOARD ORDINARILY MEETS 3 TIMES A YEAR. BETWEEN BOARD MEETINGS, THE FOUNDATION IS DIRECTED BY AN EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE OF THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS, CONSISTING OF 10 DIRECTORS, 9 OF WHOM ARE INDEPENDENT DIRECTORS. THE 9 INDEPENDENT MEMBERS OF THE EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE ALSO ACT AS THE AUDIT COMMITTEE, RESPONSIBLE FOR THE OVERSIGHT OF THE AUDIT OF FINANCIAL STATEMENTS AND SELECTION OF AN INDEPENDENT OUTSIDE ACCOUNTANT/AUDITOR. THIS PROCESS HAS NOT CHANGED FROM THE PRIOR YEAR. |
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