Attach to Form 990 or Form 990-EZ.
Go to
www.irs.gov/Form990 for instructions and the latest information.
| (i) Name of supported organization | (ii) EIN | (iii) Type of organization (described on lines 1- 10 above (see instructions)) | (iv) Is the organization listed in your governing document? | (v) Amount of monetary support (see instructions) | (vi) Amount of other support (see instructions) | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Yes | No | |||||
|
Total |
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Calendar year (or fiscal year beginning in) ![]() |
(a) 2016 | (b) 2017 | (c) 2018 | (d) 2019 | (e) 2020 | (f) Total | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | Gifts, grants, contributions, and membership fees received. (Do not include any "unusual grant.") .. | 484,180 | 266,841 | 516,152 | 408,172 | 301,289 | 1,976,634 |
| 2 | Tax revenues levied for the organization's benefit and either paid to or expended on its behalf.... | ||||||
| 3 | The value of services or facilities furnished by a governmental unit to the organization without charge.. | ||||||
| 4 | Total. Add lines 1 through 3 | 484,180 | 266,841 | 516,152 | 408,172 | 301,289 | 1,976,634 |
| 5 | The portion of total contributions by each person (other than a governmental unit or publicly supported organization) included on line 1 that exceeds 2% of the amount shown on line 11, column (f).. | 651,996 | |||||
| 6 | Public support. Subtract line 5 from line 4. | 1,324,638 | |||||
Calendar year
(or fiscal year beginning in) ![]() |
(a) 2016 | (b) 2017 | (c) 2018 | (d) 2019 | (e) 2020 | (f) Total | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 7 | Amounts from line 4.. | 484,180 | 266,841 | 516,152 | 408,172 | 301,289 | 1,976,634 |
| 8 | Gross income from interest, dividends, payments received on securities loans, rents, royalties and income from similar sources... | 115 | 255 | 338 | 624 | 621 | 1,953 |
| 9 | Net income from unrelated business activities, whether or not the business is regularly carried on.. | ||||||
| 10 | Other income. Do not include gain or loss from the sale of capital assets (Explain in Part VI.).. | ||||||
| 11 | Total support. Add lines 7 through 10 | 1,978,587 | |||||
Calendar year (or fiscal year beginning in) ![]() |
(a) 2016 | (b) 2017 | (c) 2018 | (d) 2019 | (e) 2020 | (f) Total | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | Gifts, grants, contributions, and membership fees received. (Do not include any "unusual grants.") . | ||||||
| 2 | Gross receipts from admissions, merchandise sold or services performed, or facilities furnished in any activity that is related to the organization's tax-exempt purpose | ||||||
| 3 | Gross receipts from activities that are not an unrelated trade or business under section 513 ..... | ||||||
| 4 | Tax revenues levied for the organization's benefit and either paid to or expended on its behalf... | ||||||
| 5 | The value of services or facilities furnished by a governmental unit to the organization without charge | ||||||
| 6 | Total. Add lines 1 through 5 | ||||||
| 7a | Amounts included on lines 1, 2, and 3 received from disqualified persons | ||||||
| b | Amounts included on lines 2 and 3 received from other than disqualified persons that exceed the greater of $5,000 or 1% of the amount on line 13 for the year. | ||||||
| c | Add lines 7a and 7b.. | ||||||
| 8 | Public support. (Subtract line 7c from line 6.) | ||||||
Calendar year (or fiscal year beginning in) ![]() |
(a) 2016 | (b) 2017 | (c) 2018 | (d) 2019 | (e) 2020 | (f) Total | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 9 | Amounts from line 6... | ||||||
| 10a | Gross income from interest, dividends, payments received on securities loans, rents, royalties and income from similar sources.. | ||||||
| b | Unrelated business taxable income (less section 511 taxes) from businesses acquired after June 30, 1975. | ||||||
| c | Add lines 10a and 10b. | ||||||
| 11 | Net income from unrelated business activities not included in line 10b, whether or not the business is regularly carried on. | ||||||
| 12 | Other income. Do not include gain or loss from the sale of capital assets (Explain in Part VI.) .. | ||||||
| 13 | Total support. (Add lines 9, 10c, 11, and 12.).. | ||||||
| Section A - Adjusted Net Income | (A) Prior Year |
(B) Current Year (optional) |
||||
| 1 | Net short-term capital gain | 1 | ||||
| 2 | Recoveries of prior-year distributions | 2 | ||||
| 3 | Other gross income (see instructions) | 3 | ||||
| 4 | Add lines 1 through 3 | 4 | ||||
| 5 | Depreciation and depletion | 5 | ||||
| 6 | Portion of operating expenses paid or incurred for production or collection of gross income or for management, conservation, or maintenance of property held for production of income (see instructions) | 6 | ||||
| 7 | Other expenses (see instructions) | 7 | ||||
| 8 | Adjusted Net Income (subtract lines 5, 6 and 7 from line 4) | 8 | ||||
| Section B - Minimum Asset Amount | (A) Prior Year |
(B) Current Year (optional) |
||||
| 1 | Aggregate fair market value of all non-exempt-use assets (see instructions for short tax year or assets held for part of year): | 1 | ||||
| a | Average monthly value of securities | 1a | ||||
| b | Average monthly cash balances | 1b | ||||
| c | Fair market value of other non-exempt-use assets | 1c | ||||
| d | Total (add lines 1a, 1b, and 1c) | 1d | ||||
| e |
Discount claimed for blockage or other factors (explain in detail in Part VI): |
|||||
| 2 | Acquisition indebtedness applicable to non-exempt use assets | 2 | ||||
| 3 | Subtract line 2 from line 1d | 3 | ||||
| 4 | Cash deemed held for exempt use. Enter 0.015 of line 3 (for greater amount, see instructions). | 4 | ||||
| 5 | Net value of non-exempt-use assets (subtract line 4 from line 3) | 5 | ||||
| 6 | Multiply line 5 by 0.035 | 6 | ||||
| 7 | Recoveries of prior-year distributions | 7 | ||||
| 8 | Minimum Asset Amount (add line 7 to line 6) | 8 | ||||
| Section C - Distributable Amount | Current Year | |||||
| 1 | Adjusted net income for prior year (from Section A, line 8, Column A) | 1 | ||||
| 2 | Enter 85% of line 1 | 2 | ||||
| 3 | Minimum asset amount for prior year (from Section B, line 8, Column A) | 3 | ||||
| 4 | Enter greater of line 2 or line 3 | 4 | ||||
| 5 | Income tax imposed in prior year | 5 | ||||
| 6 | Distributable Amount. Subtract line 5 from line 4, unless subject to emergency temporary reduction (see instructions) | 6 | ||||
| Section D - Distributions | Current Year | |
|---|---|---|
| 1 Amounts paid to supported organizations to accomplish exempt purposes | 1 | |
|
2
Amounts paid to perform activity that directly furthers exempt purposes of supported organizations, in excess of income from activity |
2 | |
| 3 Administrative expenses paid to accomplish exempt purposes of supported organizations | 3 | |
| 4 Amounts paid to acquire exempt-use assets | 4 | |
| 5 Qualified set-aside amounts (prior IRS approval required - provide details in Part VI) | 5 | |
| 6 Other distributions (describe in Part VI). See instructions | 6 | |
| 7Total annual distributions. Add lines 1 through 6. | 7 | |
|
8
Distributions to attentive supported organizations to which the organization is responsive (provide details in Part VI). See instructions |
8 | |
| 9 Distributable amount for 2020 from Section C, line 6 | 9 | |
| 10 Line 8 amount divided by Line 9 amount | 10 | |
| Section E - Distribution Allocations (see instructions) |
(i) Excess Distributions |
(ii) Underdistributions Pre-2020 |
(iii) Distributable Amount for 2020 |
|
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 Distributable amount for 2020 from Section C, line 6 | ||||
|
2
Underdistributions, if any, for years prior to 2019 (reasonable cause required-- explain in Part VI). See instructions. |
||||
| 3 Excess distributions carryover, if any, to 2020: | ||||
| a From 2015....... | ||||
| b From 2016....... | ||||
| c From 2017....... | ||||
| d From 2018....... | ||||
| e From 2019....... | ||||
| fTotal of lines 3a through e | ||||
| g Applied to underdistributions of prior years | ||||
| h Applied to 2020 distributable amount | ||||
|
i
Carryover from 2015 not applied (see instructions) |
||||
| j Remainder. Subtract lines 3g, 3h, and 3i from line 3f. | ||||
| 4Distributions for 2020 from Section D, line 7: | ||||
| $ | ||||
| a Applied to underdistributions of prior years | ||||
| b Applied to 2020 distributable amount | ||||
| c Remainder. Subtract lines 4a and 4b from line 4. | ||||
|
5
Remaining underdistributions for years prior to 2020, if any. Subtract lines 3g and 4a from line 2. If the amount is greater than zero, explain in Part VI. See instructions. |
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|
6
Remaining underdistributions for 2020. Subtract lines 3h and 4b from line 1. If the amount is greater than zero, explain in Part VI. See instructions. |
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|
7 Excess distributions carryover to 2021. Add lines 3j and 4c. |
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| 8 Breakdown of line 7: | ||||
| a Excess from 2016..... | ||||
| b Excess from 2017..... | ||||
| c Excess from 2018..... | ||||
| d Excess from 2019..... | ||||
| e Excess from 2020..... | ||||
| Facts And Circumstances Test |
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| Return Reference | Explanation |
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| Software ID: | |
| Software Version: |
Attach to Form 990 or 990-EZ.
Go to www.irs.gov/Form990 for the latest information.
| Return Reference | Explanation |
|---|---|
| FORM 990, PART III 4A, DESCRIPTION OF PROGRAM SERVICE: | SOME OF THE PRINCIPAL AREAS ON WHICH WE FOCUSED IN 2019 WERE: CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES ATLANTIC LEGAL FOUNDATION PARTICIPATES IN IMPORTANT CASES SEEKING TO LIMIT THE EXPANSIVE AND CAPRICIOUS EXERCISE OF GOVERNMENTAL POWER. THE ISSUES WE HAVE ADDRESSED INCLUDE CHALLENGING THE EXPANSION OF BUREAUCRATIC POWER, STATE AND LOCAL ATTEMPTS TO REGULATE INTERSTATE AND FOREIGN COMMERCE, COMBATING LIMITS ON FREE SPEECH IN PUBLIC FORA AND ON COLLEGE CAMPUSES, AND OPPOSING EXPANSIVE ASSERTIONS OF U.S. COURT JURISDICTION OVER FOREIGN ENTITIES AND TRANSACTIONS. SOUND SCIENCE IN LITIGATION AND REGULATION ATLANTIC LEGAL IS THE NATION'S PREEMINENT PUBLIC INTEREST LAW FIRM ADVOCATING FOR THE ADMISSIBILITY OF SOUND MEDICAL AND EXPERT TESTIMONY IN TOXIC TORT, PRODUCT LIABILITY AND OTHER LITIGATION. ATLANTIC LEGAL FIGHTS THE ADMISSIBILITY OF "JUNK" SCIENCE, AND FOSTERS THE USE OF SOUND SCIENCE PRINCIPLES IN JUDICIAL AND REGULATORY PROCEEDINGS. OUR AMICUS BRIEFS ON BEHALF OF NUMEROUS NOBEL LAUREATES AND MANY OTHER PROMINENT SCIENTISTS WERE CITED AND RELIED ON BY THE MAJORITY IN THE LANDMARK DAUBERT TRILOGY OF U. S. SUPREME COURT CASES AS WELL AS CASES IN FEDERAL APPELLATE COURTS AND THE HIGHEST COURTS OF THE MOST POPULOUS STATES, INCLUDING CALIFORNIA, FLORIDA, NEW YORK AND PENNSYLVANIA. ISSUES IMPACTING THE MARKET ECONOMY ATLANTIC LEGAL ADVOCATES AGAINST INTRUSIVE REGULATION OF BUSINESS AND ADVOCATES FOR RESPONSIBLE CORPORATE GOVERNANCE. THE FOUNDATION WAS AN EARLY PROPONENT OF PRESERVATION OF THE ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE AGAINST COMPULSORY WAIVER OF THAT ESSENTIAL PROTECTION WHERE CORPORATE MISCONDUCT HAS BEEN ASSERTED. IT HAS CHALLENGED ABUSE OF CLASS ACTION PROCEDURES AND HAS STRONGLY ADVOCATED FOR THE ENFORCEMENT OF ARBITRATION AGREEMENTS. EDUCATIONAL CHOICE THE ATLANTIC LEGAL FOUNDATION HAS LONG SUPPORTED CHARTER SCHOOLS' LAUDABLE GOALS OF REFORMING PUBLIC EDUCATION. THE FOUNDATION HAS SUPPORTED THE CHARTER SCHOOL COMMUNITY BY PROVIDING UNIQUE LABOR LAW GUIDANCE TO SCHOOL LEADERSHIP THROUGH A SERIES OF BOOKS ENTITLED "LEVELING THE PLAYING FIELD," ADDRESSING THE DIFFICULT AREA OF UNION ORGANIZING, COLLECTIVE BARGAINING, AND RELATED EMPLOYEE RIGHTS AT CHARTER SCHOOLS. THESE ISSUES HAVE HISTORICALLY BEEN DETERMINED BY THE INDIVIDUAL STATES' CHARTER SCHOOL LEGISLATION AND PUBLIC SECTOR LABOR LAW, SINCE ALL CHARTER SCHOOLS ARE PUBLIC SCHOOLS, AS DEFINED BY THE VARIOUS STATE STATUTES. THE LEVELING SERIES RAISED THE QUESTION OF WHETHER THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS ACT (NLRA), AND NOT STATE LAW, SHOULD HAVE JURISDICTION OVER CHARTER SCHOOLS, DESPITE THEIR STATES' CHARACTERIZATION AS "PUBLIC SCHOOLS." ALTHOUGH THERE IS VARIATION FROM STATE TO STATE, IN MOST INSTANCES, CHARTER SCHOOLS ARE CREATED BY AND ADMINISTERED BY PRIVATE ENTITIES, ALTHOUGH FUNDED PUBLICLY AND SUBJECT TO STATE REGULATION. A FEW YEARS AFTER THESE PUBLICATIONS, THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD (NLRB) BEGAN TO ASSERT FEDERAL LABOR LAW JURISDICTION OVER CHARTER SCHOOLS IN VARIOUS STATES. THERE ARE MYRIAD DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE LABOR LAWS OF THE INDIVIDUAL STATES AND THAT OF THE NLRA. SOME STATES HAVE NO COLLECTIVE BARGAINING RIGHTS FOR TEACHERS. SOME HAVE LIMITED RIGHTS. SOME ALLOW EMPLOYEES TO VOTE ON UNIONIZATION THROUGH SECRET BALLOT ELECTIONS. OTHERS DO NOT. IT IS AMPLY CLEAR THAT NO STATE LABOR LAW PROVIDES PROTECTIONS AND RIGHTS TO EMPLOYEES AS BROADLY AS THE NLRA. THE LAWS OF SOME STATES TILT TOWARD THE BENEFIT OF THE EMPLOYERS, OTHERS, TOWARD THE UNIONS. AS A RESULT, CHARTER SCHOOL EMPLOYERS AROUND THE COUNTRY HAVE THEIR OWN PREFERENCES. IN SOME CASES, UNIONS SOUGHT NLRB JURISDICTION. IN OTHERS, EMPLOYERS SOUGHT IT. AS THE NLRB HAS ADDED MORE STATES TO ITS JURISDICTIONS, INTERESTED PARTIES ON BOTH SIDES HAVE RAISED THEIR CONCERNS. BECAUSE THE NLRB ISSUES DECISIONS ON A CASE BY CASE BASIS, ITS EXTENSION OF JURISDICTION OVER CHARTER SCHOOLS HAS BEEN LIMITED TO THOSE SCHOOLS IN WHICH A UNION, EMPLOYEES, OR AN EMPLOYER HAS BROUGHT A CASE. THE LEGAL ANALYSIS UTILIZED BY THE BOARD DETERMINES WHETHER THE SCHOOL IS A "POLITICAL SUBDIVISION" OF THE STATE. IF THE CHARTER SCHOOL INITIATED BY A GOVERNMENT ENTITY, OR IF THE GOVERNMENT HAS MANAGEMENT CONTROL, THE SCHOOL IS A POLITICAL SUBDIVISION AND IS EXEMPT FROM THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS ACT. TO DATE, EITHER THE NLRB ITSELF, ITS REGIONAL DIRECTORS OR ITS ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGES HAVE EXERCISED JURISDICTION OVER CHARTER SCHOOLS IN ARIZONA, CALIFORNIA, CONNECTICUT, DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, ILLINOIS, LOUISIANA, MAINE, MICHIGAN, MINNESOTA, NEW YORK, OHIO, OREGON, PENNSYLVANIA, RHODE ISLAND, AND TENNESSEE. IN EVERY CASE BROUGHT TO THE NLRB, THE BOARD HAS DETERMINED THE SCHOOL IS NOT A POLITICAL SUBDIVISION WITH ONE LONE EXCEPTION. IN ONE CASE ARISING IN TEXAS, THE BOARD DID DECLINE JURISDICTION DUE TO A GREATER LEVEL OF AUTHORITY OVER THE CHARTER SCHOOL RETAINED BY THE STATE. ALTHOUGH NLRB CASES IN MOST STATES HAVE YET TO BE LITIGATED, IT IS CLEAR THAT THE WEIGHT OF BOARD LAW (EXCEPT IN TEXAS) SUPPORTS FEDERAL JURISDICTION. THE RISE OF CHARTER SCHOOLS HAS BEEN HIGHLY POLITICIZED. THE NLRB, SOMEWHAT SURPRISINGLY, BEGAN ASSERTING NLRA JURISDICTION OVER CHARTER SCHOOLS IN 2012, DURING THE YEARS OF THE OBAMA BOARD WHEN DEMOCRATS HELD A MAJORITY OF SEATS ON THE BOARD. IN THOSE YEARS, THE REPUBLICAN MINORITY WERE VOCAL DISSENTERS ON THIS SUBJECT GENERALLY ASSERTING A "STATES' RIGHTS" VIEW SUPPORTING A STATE LEGISLATURE'S PREROGATIVE TO DEFINE WHETHER ITS CHARTER SCHOOLS WERE LEGALLY EQUIVALENT TO PUBLIC SCHOOLS. UNDER THE TRUMP ADMINISTRATION, THE BOARD OBTAINED A REPUBLICAN MAJORITY. THE NLRB SOON BEGAN HINTING THAT WHEN THE RIGHT CASE CAME BEFORE IT IT WOULD TAKE THE RADICAL STEP OF WITHDRAWING FEDERAL JURISDICTION FROM ALL CHARTER SCHOOLS NATIONALLY. SECTION 14(C)(1) OF THE NLRA PROVIDES THE BOARD WITH THE EXTRAORDINARY DISCRETION TO DECLINE JURISDICTION OF THE LAW OVER ALL EMPLOYERS WITHIN A PARTICULAR INDUSTRY, AS A CLASS. IT IS ALMOST NEVER UTILIZED, AND CERTAINLY NEVER OVER WORKPLACES AS WIDESPREAD AS CHARTER SCHOOLS HAVE BECOME. THE CASE THE BOARD APPEARED TO BE WAITING FOR FINALLY ARRIVED. A NEW YORK CITY CHARTER SCHOOL ONE OF THE VERY FIRST CHARTERS IN THE STATE HAD BEEN (DUE TO THE PECULIARITIES OF STATE LAW) UNIONIZED SINCE ITS INCEPTION IN 1999. ITS EMPLOYEES NEVER VOTED FOR UNIONIZATION, NOR IN ANY WAY EXPRESSED A DESIRE TO BE UNION REPRESENTED. UNDER LOCAL LAW, THE POWERHOUSE UNITED FEDERATION OF TEACHERS (UFT) REPRESENTED THE SCHOOL STAFF AS PART OF THE SINGLE BARGAINING UNIT COVERING OVER 70,000 CITY PUBLIC SCHOOL TEACHERS. THE UFT COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT CONTAINS TERMS AND WORKING CONDITIONS THAT ARE ANATHEMA TO CHARTER SCHOOL PHILOSOPHY. CURIOUSLY, THE UFT HAS NEVER ENFORCED ITS CONTRACT REGARDING THE SCHOOL'S EDUCATIONAL OPERATIONS. HOWEVER, THE TEACHERS CHAFED UNDER UNION RULES, INCLUDING MANDATORY PAYMENT OF SIGNIFICANT UNION DUES. YEARS LATER, THE TEACHERS PETITIONED TO "DECERTIFY" THE UFT MEANING TO REMOVE THEM AS THEIR BARGAINING REPRESENTATIVE. AT THE TIME, STATE LAW APPLIED, AND AFTER THREE YEARS OF LITIGATING, THE STATE LABOR AGENCY RULED THAT ONE SCHOOL'S EMPLOYEES COULD NOT "DECERTIFY" THE UNION AS TO THEIR SINGLE SCHOOL; ONLY THE ENTIRE SCHOOL SYSTEM COULD DO SO. THEIR PETITION WAS DISMISSED. AFTER 2012, CHARTER SCHOOLS IN NEW YORK BEGAN CONSIDERING THEIR OPTIONS UNDER THE EMERGING NEW NLRB CASES EXTENDING JURISDICTION. ATLANTIC LEGAL FOUNDATION ADVISORY COUNCIL MEMBER TOM WALSH COUNSELED SEVERAL SCHOOLS, RESULTING IN A LANDMARK 2016 NLRB DECISION INTERPRETING NEW YORK STATE LAW TO REQUIRE FEDERAL JURISDICTION. IT SHOULD BE NOTED THAT A KEY ELEMENT OF NY LABOR LAW IS THAT UNION ORGANIZING IS ACHIEVED BY "CARD CHECK" WHICH DENIES EMPLOYEES A SECRET BALLOT ELECTION. THE NLRA IS PREMISED ON THE PRINCIPLE OF A DEMOCRATIC VOTE. FOR SEVERAL YEARS, UNIONS SEEKING TO ORGANIZE NEW YORK CHARTER SCHOOLS CONTINUED TO CONTEST THE NLRB'S "POLITICAL SUBDIVISION" TEST, TO NO AVAIL. ABSENT THE ADVANTAGE OF "CARD CHECK, UNIONS WERE OFTEN UNSUCCESSFUL IN ORGANIZING SCHOOLS. IN 2017 THE EMPLOYEES WHOSE PETITION TO DECERTIFY WAS REJECTED BY THE STATE LABOR BOARD FILED A NEW DECERTIFICATION PETITION, THIS TIME WITH THE NLRB. ATLANTIC LEGAL'S ADVISORY COUNCIL LABOR LAW SPECIALIST TOM WALSH REPRESENTED THE CHARTER SCHOOL EMPLOYER IN THIS MATTER. EIGHTEEN MONTHS LATER, THE BOARD'S NEW YORK REGIONAL DIRECTOR ISSUED A DECISION GRANTING THE EMPLOYEES A DECERTIFICATION ELECTION. THE UFT APPEALED TO THE FULL BOARD IN WASHINGTON, D.C. THE NEWLY SEATED BOARD GOP MAJORITY TOOK THE OPPORTUNITY TO CONSIDER WHETHER THE NLRB MIGHT WITHDRAW JURISDICTION FROM ALL CHARTER SCHOOLS, AS IT HAD THREATENED TO DO DESPITE THE FACT THAT NO PARTY IN THE CASE REQUESTED THE RESULT. |
| THE NLRB ISSUED A CALL FOR AMICI TO FILE BRIEFS. THE ATLANTIC LEGAL | FOUNDATION WAS INTERESTED IN BEING HEARD ON THIS SUBJECT. THE FOUNDATION CONSULTED WITH STATE AND NATIONAL CHARTER SCHOOL GROUPS. ULTIMATELY, THE ALF DECLINED TO FILE AN AMICUS BRIEF BECAUSE SCHOOLS AND CHARTER SCHOOL ASSOCIATIONS THE FOUNDATION SUPPORTS ARE ON BOTH SIDES OF THE MATTER, OFTEN DEPENDING UPON WHERE THEY ARE LOCATED. THE SCHOOL AND ITS EMPLOYEES ARGUED THAT ALTHOUGH THE BOARD HAS THE STATUTORY AUTHORITY TO WITHDRAW JURISDICTION, THERE WAS NO EVIDENCE SUPPORTING SUCH AN UNPRECEDENTED ABANDONMENT OF EMPLOYEE RIGHTS. ILLUSTRATED BY A PARTIAL LIST OF THE SCORES OF CASES IN WHICH THE NLRB, ITS REGIONAL OFFICES, ITS ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGES, AND ITS GENERAL COUNSEL PROCESSED CHARGES AND PETITIONS, THE SCHOOL ASKED THE BOARD HOW IT COULD NOW REVERSE COURSE AND ADVICE THOUSANDS OF EMPLOYEES THAT THEY NO LONGER ENJOYED THE PROTECTIONS OF THE NLRA. ON MARCH 25, 2020, THE NLRB ISSUED ITS DECISION, DETERMINING NOT TO EXERCISE IS DISCRETION TO DECLINE JURISDICTION OVER CHARTER SCHOOLS AS A CLASS." KIPP ACADEMY CHARTER SCHOOL, 368 NLRB NO. 48. IN THE ANALYSIS, THE BOARD APPEARS SATISFIED TO ALLOW THE STATUS QUO TO REMAIN. IT SEEMS LIKELY THAT BOARD JURISDICTION WILL CONTINUE TO BE EXTENDED. BUT, THERE ARE STILL MANY STATES' LAWS WHICH HAVE NOT BEEN SUBJECT TO THE BOARD'S ANALYSIS. CHARTER SCHOOL OPERATIONS IN THESE STATES IN WHICH THE BOARD HAS AFFIRMATIVELY FOUND JURISDICTION SHOULD BE AWARE OF EMPLOYERS' RIGHTS AND RESPONSIBILITIES UNDER THE LAW WHICH MAY SIGNIFICANTLY DIFFER FROM STATE LAW. EMPLOYERS IN STATES NOT YET REVIEWED BY THE NLRB SHOULD BE AWARE OF THE POSSIBILITY THAT THE STATE LAW THEY HAVE OPERATED UNDER MAY CHANGE WITHOUT NOTICE FEDERAL LAW GENERALLY PROVIDES A GREATER DEGREE OF PROTECTIONS TO EMPLOYEES THAN STATES' PUBLIC SECTOR LABOR LAWS. THE ATLANTIC LEGAL FOUNDATION WILL CONTINUE TO MONITOR THE LEGAL LANDSCAPE FOR CHARTER SCHOOLS, AND WHERE APPROPRIATE, WILL EXTEND SUPPORT. CASES IN 2019, 2020 AND EARLY 2021 THE FOUNDATION'S PRINCIPAL LEGAL ACTIVITY CONSISTS OF FILING AMICUS BRIEFS IN THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT, FEDERAL APPELLATE COURTS, AND THE HIGHEST COURTS OF SEVERAL KEY STATES. IN 2020 AND EARLY 2021 WE FILED BRIEFS IN A NUMBER OF SIGNIFICANT CASES INVOLVING A VARIETY OF CRITICAL ISSUES AND COMMENCED WORK ON OTHER CASES IN WHICH WE FILED BRIEFS IN 2020 AND 2021. IN ADDITION TO THE CASES IN WHICH WE FILED BRIEFS, THE FOUNDATION'S STAFF SPENDS SUBSTANTIAL TIME RESEARCHING, ANALYZING AND PRESENTING TO THE FOUNDATION'S BOARD NUMEROUS CASES IN WHICH WE ULTIMATELY DECIDE NOT TO PARTICIPATE. OUR CASES COME TO US IN NUMEROUS WAYS: REQUESTS FROM LAW FIRMS, PRINCIPALLY LAW FIRMS WITH ESTABLISHED SUPREME COURT PRACTICES, TO SUPPORT THEM EITHER ON THE MERITS OR AT THE PETITION STAGE; REQUESTS DIRECTLY FROM POTENTIAL AMICUS CLIENTS, INCLUDING TRADE ASSOCIATIONS, CIVIC ASSOCIATIONS, THINK TANKS, AND INDIVIDUALS OR GROUPS OF INDIVIDUALS; PERUSAL OF LEGAL, SCIENTIFIC AND INDUSTRY PERIODICALS AND ONLINE BLOGS THAT REPORT ON LEGAL MATTERS OF INTEREST TO THAT TRADE OR PROFESSION; BULLETINS AND "AMICUS CONFERENCE CALLS" FROM THE HERITAGE FOUNDATION AND SIMILAR GROUPS; AD HOC DISCUSSIONS WITH OTHER LAWYERS IN PUBLIC INTEREST LAW FIRMS AND IN PRIVATE PRACTICE; AND CONSULTATIONS WITH MEMBERS OF ATLANTIC LEGAL'S BOARD OF DIRECTORS AND ADVISORY COUNCIL. THE VERY NATURE OF THESE SOURCES TENDS TO APPRISE US OF CURRENT "HOT" ISSUES OF IMPORTANCE. ONCE A CASE COMES TO THE ATTENTION OF ATLANTIC LEGAL'S STAFF, IT IS DISCUSSED WITH EITHER THE BOARD OR THE EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE OF THE BOARD, DEPENDING ON THE TIME CONSTRAINTS. COMPELLED SPEECH - WHETHER RETAIL STORES CAN BE REQUIRED TO POST SIGNS WARNING CUSTOMERS OF THE "DANGERS" OF CELL PHONES, WHEN THE FCC (WHICH BY FEDERAL LAW HAS SUPERVISORY JURISDICTION OVER CELLULAR DEVICES) AND THE CONSENSUS OF RELEVANT SCIENTIFIC ORGANIZATIONS HAS FOUND NO EMISSION OF DANGEROUS LEVELS OF IONIZING RADIATION BY CELL PHONES. THIS CASE INVOLVES BOTH FREE SPEECH ISSUES AND SOUND SCIENCE ISSUES. ARBITRATION OF DISPUTES - DESPITE A CLEAR STATUTORY ENACTMENT FAVORING ARBITRATION AS AN EFFECTIVE AND EFFICIENT ALTERNATIVE TO PROTRACTED, EXPENSIVE AND BURDENSOME LITIGATION, MANY STATE AND LOWER FEDERAL COURTS REMAIN HOSTILE TO ENFORCEMENT OF CONTRACTUAL ARBITRATION PROVISIONS. AS A RESULT, THE SUPREME COURT HAS BEEN CALLED UPON SEVERAL TIMES IN THE PAST FEW YEARS TO REITERATE ITS HOLDINGS INSTRUCTING INFERIOR COURTS TO ENFORCE AND APPLY THE FEDERAL ARBITRATION ACT. ATLANTIC LEGAL HAS FREQUENTLY FILED AMICUS BRIEFS IN THOSE CASES, INCLUDING WHAT HAS BEEN CALLED THE "BLOCKBUSTER EPIC SYSTEMS CASE." ONE LEADING SUPREME COURT PRACTITIONER RECENTLY "RECOGNIZE[D] THE ALF'S STRONG TRACK RECORD IN ADVOCATING FOR THE FAIR ENFORCEMENT OF ARBITRATION AGREEMENTS, AS WELL AS ADDRESSING ISSUES AFFECTING THE BUSINESS COMMUNITY GENERALLY." ADMISSIBILITY OF EXPERT TESTIMONY ON EXPOSURE TO ALLEGED TOXINS AND MEDICAL CAUSATION OF DISEASE - THESE CASES, IN STATE AND FEDERAL APPELLATE COURTS, TYPICALLY INVOLVE THE ISSUE WHETHER AN EXPERT'S CAUSATION TESTIMONY BASED ON "CUMULATIVE EXPOSURE" THAT DOES NOT IDENTIFY A SPECIFIC DEFENDANT'S PRODUCT AS THE CAUSE OF THE DISEASE OR FAILS TO QUANTIFY THE PLAINTIFF'S EXPOSURE IS CONSISTENT WITH SOUND SCIENCE AND ADMISSIBLE. IN THE NEW YORK COURT OF APPEALS, WE REPRESENTED A GROUP OF SCIENTISTS IN SUBMITTING AN AMICUS BRIEF IN AN ASBESTOS-MESOTHELIOMA CASE THAT RESULTED IN THE COURT REJECTING PLAINTIFF'S "CUMULATIVE EXPOSURE" THEORY OF ASBESTOS DISEASE CAUSATION. OUR BRIEF, ON BEHALF OF SEVERAL PROMINENT SCIENTISTS AND DOCTORS WITH EXPERTISE IN TOXICOLOGY, PATHOLOGY, MINERALOGY AND OTHER RELEVANT DISCIPLINES, POINTED OUT THAT THE "CUMULATIVE EXPOSURE" THEORY IS NOT SUPPORTED BY THE OVERWHELMING CONSENSUS OF RELEVANT EPIDEMIOLOGICAL STUDIES, AND, EVEN IF IT WERE SO SUPPORTED, WOULD NOT PROVE "SPECIFIC CAUSATION" AS REQUIRED BY NEW YORK LAW. THE NEW YORK SPECIAL ASBESTOS COURT, BASED IN NEW YORK CITY, HAD HERETOFORE BEEN KNOWN AS AN "ASBESTOS LIABILITY HELL-HOLE." ALTHOUGH JUNI V, A.O. SMITH DID NOT BREAK NEW GROUND IN NEW YORK LAW ON MEDICAL CAUSATION, IT APPLIED THOSE PRINCIPLES IN AN ASBESTOS CASE AND AFFIRMED AN EXCELLENT AND WELL-REASONED DECISION OF THE LOWER COURTS. AS A RESULT OF THIS SALUTARY DECISION, WE HAVE ALREADY SEEN AN UPTICK IN THE WILLINGNESS OF TRIAL LEVEL COURTS TO GRANT MOTIONS IN LIMINE AND TO DISMISS CASES BASED ON WEAK EXPERT EVIDENCE. THE FLORIDA SUPREME COURT REVERSED ITSELF IN A SIGNIFICANT CASE ON THE ADMISSIBILITY OF EXPERT TESTIMONY ON EXPOSURE TO ASBESTOS AND CAUSATION OF MESOTHELIOMA. THIS CASE INVOLVED TWO ISSUES: (1) SEPARATION OF POWERS WHETHER THE LEGISLATURE CAN ENACT A LAW GOVERNING THE ADMISSIBILITY OF EVIDENCE, OR WHETHER THAT INFRINGES THE POWER OF THE JUDICIAL BRANCH; AND (2) WHETHER AN EXPERT'S CAUSATION TESTIMONY BASED ON "CUMULATIVE EXPOSURE" THAT DOES NOT IDENTIFY A SPECIFIC DEFENDANT'S PRODUCT AS THE CAUSE OF THE DISEASE IS CONSISTENT WITH SOUND SCIENCE AND ADMISSIBLE. THE FLORIDA SUPREME COURT INITIALLY HELD THAT THE STATE LEGISLATURE'S ADOPTION OF AMENDMENTS TO THE RULES OF EVIDENCE ADOPTING A "DAUBERT" STANDARD CONTRAVENED THE JUDICIARY'S CONSTITUTIONAL POWER TO DETERMINE JUDICIAL PROCEDURES AND THUS WAS VOID. SUBSEQUENTLY, IN THE SAME CASE IN WHICH ATLANTIC LEGAL FILED AN AMICUS BRIEF ON BEHALF OF SEVERAL PROMINENT SCIENTISTS -- BUT AFTER A CHANGE IN THE COMPOSITION OF THE COURT, THE COURT ITSELF APPROVED THE DAUBERT-LIKE ANALYSIS OF THE ADMISSIBILITY OF EXPERT TESTIMONY WHICH WE HAD ADVOCATED. AS A RESULT, FLORIDA HAS JOINED A GROWING MAJORITY OF STATES THAT HAVE ADOPTED DAUBERT CRITERIA. THIS IS ANOTHER EXAMPLE OF ATLANTIC LEGAL QUIETLY MAKING A DIFFERENCE AND IMPROVING JURISPRUDENCE. DUE PROCESS AND FIRST AMENDMENT - CY PRES SETTLEMENTS, FRANK V. GAOS, U.S. SUPREME COURT - CY PRES SETTLEMENTS - DECIDED MARCH 19, 2019 THREE NAMED PLAINTIFFS BROUGHT CLASS ACTION CLAIMS AGAINST GOOGLE FOR ALLEGED VIOLATIONS OF THE STORED COMMUNICATIONS ACT, AMONG OTHER CLAIMS. ULTIMATELY, THE PARTIES NEGOTIATED A SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT THAT WOULD REQUIRE GOOGLE TO INCLUDE CERTAIN DISCLOSURES ON SOME OF ITS WEBPAGES AND WOULD DISTRIBUTE MORE THAN $5 MILLION TO CY PRES RECIPIENTS, MORE THAN $2 MILLION TO CLASS COUNSEL, AND NO MONEY TO ABSENT CLASS MEMBERS. PETITIONERS ARE CLASS MEMBERS WHO OBJECTED TO THE SETTLEMENT, ARGUING THAT CY PRESS ONLY RELIEF DOES NOT COMPLY WITH THE REQUIREMENTS OF FED. RULE CIV. PROC. 23(E) AND WAS NOT JUSTIFIED UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES. THE DISTRICT COURT NEVERTHELESS GRANTED FINAL APPROVAL OF THE SETTLEMENT, AND THE NINTH CIRCUIT AFFIRMED. |
| CY PRES SETTLEMENTS OF CLASS ACTIONS HAVE BECOME AN "EASY" WAY FOR THE | PARTIES TO SETTLE A CASE, WHILE "MAKING EVERYONE HAPPY." IN THE TYPICAL CY PRES CASE, ONLY A SMALL PORTION OF THE SETTLEMENT FUND INVOLVES CLAIMS BY ACTUAL CLASS MEMBERS OR FUNDS THAT CAN'T BE DISTRIBUTED BECAUSE THE CLASS MEMBERS ENTITLED TO PAYMENT CANNOT BE LOCATED. IN SUCH INSTANCES THE "TAIL" OF THE SETTLEMENT FUND IS DISTRIBUTED TO ONE OR MORE CHARITABLE ORGANIZATIONS THAT HAVE SOME TENUOUS RELATIONSHIP TO THE SUBJECT MATTER OF THE CASE. IN NUMEROUS INSTANCES, THE RECIPIENT IS A COLLEGE OR LAW SCHOOL THAT HAPPENS TO BE THE ALMA MATER OF THE PLAINTIFF CLASS'S LAWYER(S), THE DEFENDANTS' LAWYER(S), AND/OR THE JUDGE. ALL THE LAWYERS COME OUT LOOKING GENEROUS AND PHILANTHROPIC (WITH OTHER PEOPLE'S MONEY); BUT AT LEAST THE PLAINTIFF CLASS COLLECTIVELY GETS A SUBSTANTIAL PAYOUT. IN THIS CASE, THE ACTUAL INJURED PARTY GOT NOTHING, NOT EVEN A COUPON TO GET A DISCOUNT ON SOME FUTURE PURCHASE FROM THE WRONG-DOER. ATLANTIC LEGAL AND THE CENTER FOR CONSTITUTIONAL LITIGATION OF THE CLAREMONT INSTITUTE JOINTLY FILED AN AMICUS BRIEF IN THE U.S. SUPREME COURT, IN SUPPORT OF PETITIONERS IN FRANK V. GAOS. IN THEIR MERITS STAGE CHALLENGE TO THE APPROVAL BY THE LOWER FEDERAL COURTS, INCLUDING THE NINTH CIRCUIT, OF A CY PRES AWARD SETTLEMENT OF A CLASS ACTION THAT PROVIDED THAT THE WHOLE OF THE SETTLEMENT FUND (NET OF ATTORNEYS' FEES AND ADMINISTRATION COSTS) WAS TO BE PAID TO ADVOCACY GROUPS; NOT A PENNY WAS PAID TO MEMBERS OF THE CLASS, WHICH CONSISTED OF 130 MILLION USERS OF GOOGLE, WHOSE PRIVACY WAS VIOLATED. WE ARGUED THAT THE CY PRES ONLY SETTLEMENT ALSO VIOLATES THE FIRST AMENDMENT RIGHTS OF THE UNNAMED CLASS MEMBERS. BY DIRECTING THE SETTLEMENT FUNDS AWAY FROM MEMBERS OF THE INJURED PLAINTIFF CLASS TO ADVOCACY GROUPS SUCH AS AARP, INC. AND THE WORLD PRIVACY FORUM, THE COURTS BELOW FORCED THE PLAINTIFF CLASS TO PROVIDE FINANCIAL SUPPORT TO ORGANIZATIONS WITH WHICH THEY MAY NOT AGREE, IN VIOLATION OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT'S PROHIBITION ON COMPELLED SPEECH. COMPELLING THE PLAINTIFF CLASS TO SUBSIDIZE THE SPEECH OF OTHERS RAISES SIMILAR CONCERNS TO COMPELLED SPEECH, JANUS V. AFSCME, 138 S. CT. AT 2464 (2018), DECIDED AT THE END OF OCTOBER 2017 TERM OF THE COURT, AND COMPELLING INDIVIDUALS TO SPEAK A PARTICULAR MESSAGE "VIOLATES [A] CARDINAL CONSTITUTIONAL COMMAND," ID.; SEE NIFLA V. BECERRA, 585 U.S. 138 S.CT. 2361 (2018). WE ALSO ARGUED THAT THE CLASS MEMBERS HAVE NO STANDING BECAUSE THE INDIVIDUALS WHO ALLEGEDLY SUFFERED HARM RECEIVED NO RELIEF AND ARE BARRED FROM SEEKING RELIEF FROM SIMILAR CONDUCT IN THE FUTURE; THUS THE COURT CANNOT REDRESS THE ALLEGED INJURY, FURTHER, THE CY PRES AWARD RECIPIENTS IN THIS CASE HAVE NO STANDING BECAUSE IN FACT THEY HAVE NOT SUFFERED ANY INJURY AND CONSEQUENTLY THE "CASE OR CONTROVERSY" REQUIREMENTS OF ARTICLE III HAVE NOT BEEN MET. THE SUPREME COURT, AGREEING WITH AN ARGUMENT WE MADE, HELD THAT THE LOWER COURTS DID NOT ADDRESS THE COURT'S OPINION IN SPOKEO, INC. V. ROBINS (2016), WHICH WAS ISSUED AFTER BRIEFING IN THE CASE WAS COMPLETE BUT PRIOR TO THE NINTH CIRCUIT'S DECISION. THE COURT DETERMINED THAT THERE WERE SUBSTANTIAL QUESTIONS ABOUT WHETHER ANY OF THE NAMED PLAINTIFFS HAS STANDING TO SUE IN LIGHT OF SPOKEO. BECAUSE THE COURT IS ONE "OF REVIEW, NOT OF FIRST VIEW," IN A PER CURIAM OPINION THE COURT VACATED THE DECISION OF THE NINTH CIRCUIT APPROVING A CY PRES ONLY CLASS ACTION SETTLEMENT AND REMANDED THE CASE FOR THE RESOLUTION OF THESE QUESTIONS. JUSTICE THOMAS, IN DISSENT, WOULD HAVE REACHED THE MERITS AND WOULD HAVE REVERSED THE NINTH CIRCUIT'S CLASS CERTIFICATION AND CLASS SETTLEMENT ORDERS BECAUSE THE CLASS MEMBERS RECEIVED NO DAMAGES OR OTHER FORM OF MEANINGFUL RELIEF. ALTHOUGH THE COURT PUNTED ON DECIDING THE FAIRNESS OF GOOGLE'S $8.5 MILLION CY PRES PRIVACY DEAL THAT STEERED FUNDS TO THIRD PARTIES INSTEAD OF CLASS MEMBERS, JUSTICE THOMAS' UNEQUIVOCAL CRITICISM OF THE ARRANGEMENT MAY BE A SIGN THAT THE HIGH COURT MAY SOON CURTAIL THE PRACTICE. ARBITRATION AGREEMENTS HENRY SCHEIN, INC., ET AL. V. ARCHER AND WHITE SALES, INC. MERITS. DECIDED JANUARY 8, 2019 JURISDICTION TO DECIDE "THRESHOLD ISSUES." JUSTICE KAVANAUGH, WRITING FOR A UNANIMOUS COURT IN HIS FIRST OPINION, REJECTED AN ASSERTED VAGUE EXCEPTION LIMITING ENFORCEMENT OF ARBITRATION AGREEMENTS IN HENRY SCHEIN INC. V. ARCHER & WHITE SALES INC. THE CASE IS THE MOST RECENT IN A DECADE LONG STRING OF OPINIONS UNDER THE FEDERAL ARBITRATION ACT, IN WHICH THE SUPREME COURT HAS CONSISTENTLY REVERSED LOWER COURT DECISIONS REFUSING TO ENFORCE ARBITRATION AGREEMENTS. MANY OF THOSE CASES HAVE BEEN DECIDED BY NARROW 5 TO 4 MAJORITIES, WHICH HAS RAISED THE POSSIBILITY THAT THE REPLACEMENT OF JUSTICE ANTHONY KENNEDY MIGHT LEAD TO SOME SOFTENING OF THE COURT'S POSITION IN THOSE CASES. IN FACT, HENRY SCHEIN INDICATES THAT EVEN THE JUSTICES MORE SKEPTICAL ABOUT ARBITRATION SAW NO MERIT IN THE ARGUMENTS AGAINST ARBITRATION HERE. THE ISSUE IN THIS CASE IS THE ARBITRABILITY OF "GATEWAY" QUESTIONS WHETHER THE UNDERLYING DISPUTE (DID THE DISTRIBUTOR BREACH A CONTRACT), IS ARBITRABLE. AT BOTTOM, THE QUESTION IS WHETHER A COURT OR AN ARBITRATOR DECIDES WHETHER AN ARBITRATION AGREEMENT GOVERNS A PARTICULAR DISPUTE. THE SUPREME COURT REPEATEDLY HAS HELD THAT THE FEDERAL ARBITRATION ACT ALLOWS THE PARTIES TO A CONTRACT TO DECIDE WHETHER AN ARBITRATION AGREEMENT WILL EXTEND TO THOSE GATEWAY QUESTIONS, EXPLAINING THAT COURTS MUST COMPEL ARBITRATION OF THE GATEWAY QUESTIONS WHENEVER THE AGREEMENT INCLUDES "CLEAR AND UNMISTAKABLE EVIDENCE" THAT THE PARTIES DELEGATED THE DECISION OF THOSE QUESTIONS TO THE ARBITRATOR. SEVERAL LOWER COURTS, HOWEVER, HAVE ADOPTED AN EXCEPTION TO THAT RULE, REASONING THAT IT WOULD BE A WASTE OF TIME TO SEND A CASE TO AN ARBITRATOR IF THE CLAIM OF ARBITRABILITY IS "WHOLLY GROUNDLESS." IN THIS CASE, FOR EXAMPLE, THE CONTRACT CALLED FOR ARBITRATION OF ANY "DISPUTE ARISING UNDER OR RELATED TO" THE CONTRACT "EXCEPT FOR ACTIONS SEEKING INJUNCTIVE RELIEF." BECAUSE THE COMPLAINT SOUGHT INJUNCTIVE RELIEF IN ADDITION TO DAMAGES, THE COURTS BELOW REASONED THAT BECAUSE THE DEFENDANT'S REQUEST FOR ARBITRATION WAS WHOLLY GROUNDLESS IT WOULD REFUSE TO COMPEL ARBITRATION. NONE OF THE JUSTICES ACCEPTED THAT APPROACH. KAVANAUGH'S OPINION WAS SUCCINCT AND METHODICAL. HE STARTED FROM THE SUPREME COURT'S REPEATED DECISIONS HOLDING THAT THE "AGREEMENT TO ARBITRATE A GATEWAY ISSUE IS SIMPLY AN ADDITIONAL AGREEMENT THE PARTY SEEKING ARBITRATION ASKS THE FEDERAL COURT TO ENFORCE, AND THE [FEDERAL ARBITRATION ACT] OPERATES ON THIS ADDITIONAL ARBITRATION AGREEMENT JUST AS IT DOES ON ANY OTHER." HE THEN POINTED OUT THE COURT'S FREQUENT REJECTION OF THE IDEA THAT A COURT SHOULD USE A CLAIM OF FRIVOLITY AS A BASIS FOR REJECTING ENFORCEMENT OF AN ARBITRATION AGREEMENT, QUOTING EARLIER DECISIONS EXPLAINING THAT COURTS HAVE "NO BUSINESS WEIGHING THE MERITS OF THE GRIEVANCE," BECAUSE THE "AGREEMENT IS TO SUBMIT ALL GRIEVANCES TO ARBITRATION, NOT MERELY THOSE WHICH THE COURT WILL DEEM MERITORIOUS." JUSTICE KAVANAUGH DISMISSED THE NOTION THAT AN EXCEPTION VITIATING "WHOLLY GROUNDLESS" REQUESTS FOR ARBITRATION "WOULD SAVE TIME AND MONEY SYSTEMICALLY." AMONG OTHER THINGS, HE SUGGESTED, SUCH AN "EXCEPTION WOULD INEVITABLY SPARK COLLATERAL LITIGATION (WITH BRIEFING, ARGUMENT, AND OPINION WRITING) OVER WHETHER A SEEMINGLY UNMERITORIOUS ARGUMENT FOR ARBITRATION IS WHOLLY GROUNDLESS, AS OPPOSED TO GROUNDLESS. WE SEE NO REASON TO CREATE SUCH A TIME CONSUMING SIDESHOW." PERHAPS IT DID NOT ESCAPE THE NOTICE OF THE JUSTICES THAT THE LITIGATION OVER ARBITRABILITY IN THIS CASE HAS CONSUMED SEVEN YEARS: ARBITRATION MIGHT HAVE BEEN A WASTE OF TIME, BUT WOULD IT HAVE WASTED SEVEN YEARS? AS THE ARGUMENT MADE CLEAR, NONE OF THE JUSTICES SAW ANY MERIT IN A PROCESS CALLING FOR COLLATERAL LITIGATION OVER THE GATEWAY QUESTION OF ARBITRABILITY. WINSTON & STRAWN, LLP V. RAMOS, U. S. SUPREME COURT, PETITION STAGE STATE RULES LIMITING ARBITRATION IN JUNE 2019 ATLANTIC LEGAL FILED AN AMICUS BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF WINSTON & STRAWN'S PETITION FOR CERTIORARI IN THIS CASE, WHICH CONCERNS THE ENFORCEABILITY OF AN ARBITRATION AGREEMENT BETWEEN A NATIONAL LAW FIRM AND ONE OF ITS FORMER PARTNERS. THE CALIFORNIA COURT OF APPEAL'S DECISION TO STRIKE THE ARBITRATION PROVISION DISREGARDS FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES OF THE FEDERAL ARBITRATION ACT (FAA) AS CONSTRUED BY THE U.S. SUPREME COURT IN A SERIES OF CASES, IN SEVERAL OF WHICH WE HAVE PARTICIPATED. IF NOT CORRECTED, THE CALIFORNIA COURT'S ERROR WILL SIGNIFICANTLY WEAKEN THE ABILITY OF ALL EMPLOYERS INCLUDING LAW FIRMS AND OTHER PROFESSIONAL SERVICE ORGANIZATIONS TO RESOLVE EMPLOYMENT RELATED DISPUTES THROUGH ARBITRATION. |
| THE PETITION ASKS THE SUPREME COURT TO CORRECT YET ANOTHER ATTEMPT BY THE | CALIFORNIA COURTS TO DISFAVOR ARBITRATION AGREEMENTS IN VIOLATION OF THE FAA AND SUPREME COURT PRECEDENT. IN PARTICULAR, THE QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOCUS ON WHETHER CALIFORNIA'S UNIQUE PROCEDURAL HURDLES FOR ARBITRATING STATUTORY EMPLOYMENT LAW CLAIMS, AS WELL AS CALIFORNIA'S ARBITRATION SPECIFIC APPROACH TO SEVERABILITY, ARE PREEMPTED BY THE FAA UNDER AT&T MOBILITY LLC V. CONCEPCION, 563 U.S. 333 (2011), AND SIMILAR CASES. CALIFORNIA COURTS HAVE DEVELOPED A HIGHLY RESTRICTIVE APPROACH TO ENFORCING ARBITRATION AGREEMENTS RESPECTING STATE STATUTORY CLAIMS. SEE ARMENDARIZ V. FOUND. PSYCH HEALTHCARE, 24 CAL. 4TH 83, 113 21 (2000) (SETTING FORTH FIVE "MINIMUM REQUIREMENTS FOR THE LAWFUL ARBITRATION OF SUCH RIGHTS, AND INVOKING "UNCONSCIONABILITY" DOCTRINE TO STRIKE ARBITRATION PROVISIONS THAT ARE "UNFAIRLY ONE SIDED"). ALTHOUGH ARMENDARIZ WAS DECIDED BEFORE CONCEPCION, THE CALIFORNIA COURT OF APPEAL HAS CONTINUED TO IMPOSE ARBITRATION SPECIFIC OBSTACLES TO THE ENFORCEMENT OF ARBITRATION PROVISIONS IN EMPLOYMENT CONTEXTS, AND THE CALIFORNIA SUPREME COURT HAS DECLINED TO CORRECT THAT ERROR. SEE, E.G., SANCHEZ V. VALENCIA HOLDING CO., LLC, 61 CAL. 4TH 899 (2015); SONIC CALABASAS A, INC. V. MORENO, 57 CAL. 4TH 1109 (2013). IN ADDITION, THE SEVERABILITY RULE APPLIED BY CALIFORNIA COURTS IS ITSELF UNIQUELY HOSTILE TO ARBITRATION CONTRACTS. CALIFORNIA COURTS WILL INVALIDATE AN ENTIRE AGREEMENT TO ARBITRATE BASED ONLY UPON THE PRESENCE OF MORE THAN ONE UNCONSCIONABLE TERM. SEE ARMENDARIZ, 24 CAL. 4TH AT 121 27. NO SUCH RULE APPLIES TO CONTRACTS GENERALLY IN CALIFORNIA. CALIFORNIA'S APPROACH TO SEVERABILITY UNIQUELY DISFAVORS ARBITRATION AGREEMENTS CONTRARY TO THE MANDATE OF THE FAA. THE OTHER QUESTION - WHETHER CALIFORNIA'S ARMENDARIZ "MINIMUM REQUIREMENTS AND ARBITRATION SPECIFIC UNCONSCIONABILITY DOCTRINE SURVIVE FAA PREEMPTION RAISES AN ISSUE ON WHICH THE SUPREME COURT HAS RECENTLY AND REPEATEDLY FOCUSED ITS ATTENTION. THE COURT HAS RECENTLY GRANTED SEVERAL PETITIONS CHALLENGING STATE COURTS' REFUSAL TO HEED FAA PREEMPTION. SEE KINDRED NURSING CTRS. LTD. P'SHIP V. CLARK, 137 S. CT. 1421 (2017); NITRO LIFT TECHS., L.L.C. V. HOWARD, 568 U.S. 17 (2012); MARMET HEALTH CARE CTR., INC. V. BROWN, 565 U.S. 530 (2012); KPMG LLP V. COCCHI 565 U.S. 18 (2011). CALIFORNIA COURTS IN PARTICULAR HAVE PRODUCED A DISPROPORTIONATE NUMBER OF THESE ARBITRATION HOSTILE DECISIONS, MAKING THIS ISSUE A STRONG CANDIDATE FOR REVERSAL. SEE, E.G., DIRECTV, INC. V. IMBURGIA, 136 S. CT. 463 (2015); PRESTON V. FERRER, 552 U.S. 346 (2008). RESPONDENT HAS ASKED FOR AND HAS BEEN GRANTED ADDITIONAL TIME TO FILE HER RESPONSE, AND THE PETITION IS SUB JUDICE. ALTHOUGH THE CERTIORARI PROCESS IS INHERENTLY UNPREDICTABLE, WE THINK THERE IS A REASONABLE CHANCE THE SUPREME COURT WILL GRANT REVIEW IN THIS CASE. FOR ONE THING, THE COURT RECENTLY GRANTED CERTIORARI IN MHN GOVERNMENT SERVICES, INC. V. ZABOROWSKI, WHICH RAISED THE QUESTION OF WHETHER CALIFORNIA'S ARBITRATION ONLY SEVERABILITY RULE IS PREEMPTED BY THE FAA; THE COURT DID NOT DECIDE THE QUESTION BECAUSE THE CASE SETTLED IN APRIL 2016, BEFORE ORAL ARGUMENT WAS HELD. SEE 136 S. CT. 1539 (2016). THERE IS NO REASON TO THINK THAT QUESTION HAS BECOME ANY LESS "CERT-WORTHY" OVER THE PAST THREE YEARS (THE ISSUE HAS NOT BEEN SQUARELY PRESENTED SINCE MHN BECAME MOOT). SEPARATION OF POWERS - JUDICIAL DEFERENCE TO ADMINISTRATIVE INTERPRETATION. KISOR V. WILKIE - U.S. SUPREME COURT. MERITS. DECIDED JUNE 26, 2019. KISOR V. WILKIE, IS A VETERAN'S BENEFIT CASE INVOLVING A U. S. MARINE WHO SOUGHT RETROACTIVE BENEFITS FOR HIS SERVICE-RELATED PTSD. THE CASE HINGED ON THE VETERANS ADMINISTRATION'S INTERPRETATION OF THE APPLICABLE FEDERAL REGULATIONS. THE COURT GRANTED REVIEW OF THE QUESTION WHETHER THE COURT SHOULD OVERRULE AUER V. ROBBINS AND BOWLES V. SEMINOLE ROCK AND SAND CO. AUER AND SEMINOLE ROCK "DIRECT COURTS TO DEFER TO AN AGENCY'S REASONABLE INTERPRETATION OF ITS OWN AMBIGUOUS REGULATION." "AUER DEFERENCE AND "CHEVRON DEFERENCE" ARE FOUNDATIONS OF THE EXPLOSIVE GROWTH IN THE POWER OF EXECUTIVE BRANCH AGENCIES. ATLANTIC LEGAL FILED ITS BRIEF IN LATE JANUARY 2019. THE CASE WAS DECIDED AT THE END OF THE COURT'S TERM IN JUNE 2019. THE CORE HOLDING OF CHEVRON IS THAT WHEN A COURT CONFRONTS AN EXECUTIVE AGENCY'S "CONSTRUCTION OF THE STATUTE WHICH IT ADMINISTERS," THEN IT WILL DEFER TO THE AGENCY SO LONG AS CONGRESS HASN'T "DIRECTLY SPOKEN" TO THE ISSUE AND THE AGENCY HAS ENGAGED IN A "PERMISSIBLE CONSTRUCTION" OF THE STATUTE. AUER REQUIRES COURTS TO DEFER TO THE AGENCY WHEN THE AGENCY'S OWN REGULATION IS AMBIGUOUS. THE RESULT IS A REGIME OF DEFERENCE UPON DEFERENCE THAT GIVES REGULATORY AGENCIES ENORMOUS AUTHORITY TO CRAFT AND THEN INTERPRET THEIR OWN REGULATIONS AND GIVES AGENCIES AN INCENTIVE TO ISSUE AMBIGUOUS RULES. THIS DEFERENCE PERMITS EXECUTIVE BRANCH AGENCIES TO EXPAND THEIR CONSTITUTIONAL ROLE AND ESSENTIALLY COMBINE ALL THREE CONSTITUTIONAL FUNCTIONS IN A SINGLE BUREAUCRATIC AGENCY WHICH IS THE LAWMAKER THAT DRAFTS REGULATIONS, THE JUDGE THAT INTERPRETS ITS OWN LAWS, AND THE EXECUTIVE THAT ENFORCES THE LAWS THAT IT HAS DRAFTED AND INTERPRETED. UNDER CHEVRON THE PEOPLE ARE REQUIRED TO GUESS WHETHER THE STATUTE WILL BE DECLARED "AMBIGUOUS" (COURTS OFTEN DISAGREE ON WHAT QUALIFIES); AND REQUIRED TO GUESS WHETHER AN AGENCY'S INTERPRETATION WILL BE DEEMED "REASONABLE." EVEN IF THE PEOPLE SOMEHOW MANAGE TO GUESS CORRECTLY, THEY MUST REMAIN ALERT TO THE POSSIBILITY THAT THE AGENCY WILL REVERSE ITS CURRENT VIEW BASED MERELY ON THE SHIFT OF POLITICAL WINDS. THE AUER DOCTRINE AMPLIFIES ALL OF THE CHEVRON PROBLEMS. UNDER AUER, THERE ARE ACTUAL ADVANTAGES IN DRAFTING BROAD AND VAGUE REGULATIONS: THEY GIVE REGULATORS MAXIMUM FLEXIBILITY, BUT FOR THE REGULATED COMMUNITY THEY CREATE LEGAL UNCERTAINTY. ATLANTIC LEGAL AND OTHER AMICI URGED THE SUPREME COURT TO RECONSIDER FEDERAL AGENCY DEFERENCE DOCTRINES, INCLUDING CHEVRON V. NATURAL RESOURCES DEFENSE COUNCIL AND AUER V. ROBBINS. THE APPLICATION OF THESE DOCTRINES VIOLATES FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES OF SEPARATION OF POWERS, DUE PROCESS AND FEDERALISM BY PERMITTING UNELECTED FEDERAL BUREAUCRATS TO PRE EMPT STATE LAWS, OUTSIDE THE PROCESS PRESCRIBED BY THE U.S. CONSTITUTION. THESE DOCTRINES UNDERMINE THE SEPARATION OF POWERS BY GRANTING BINDING INTERPRETIVE AUTHORITY TO THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH. THOUGH KISOR'S PLURALITY OPINION ASSERTS THAT AUER DEFERENCE PROMOTES DEMOCRATIC ACCOUNTABILITY BY GRANTING TO EXECUTIVE BRANCH OFFICIALS, INSTEAD OF ARTICLE III JUDGES, FINAL AUTHORITY OVER THE MEANING OF AMBIGUOUS REGULATIONS, THE OPPOSITE IS TRUE. SEPARATION OF POWERS NOT THE FEDERAL BUREAUCRACY PROVIDES THE FUNDAMENTAL SAFEGUARD FOR BOTH DEMOCRATIC ACCOUNTABILITY AND INDIVIDUAL LIBERTY. IN A FRACTURED 5-4 OPINION, THE COURT MISSED A CHANCE TO RESTORE THE ROLE OF FEDERALISM AND THE SEPARATION OF POWERS IN FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE LAW. WHILE THE KISOR MAJORITY SOUGHT TO "REINFORCE THE LIMITS AND "CABIN [] THE SCOPE" OF AUER DEFERENCE TO MAKE IT MORE RESPECTFUL OF THESE FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES, AND ALL JUSTICES EXPRESSED THE BELIEF THAT AUER NOW MEANS A LOT LESS THAN IT DID BEFORE. BUT THE CURE FOR AUER'S OVERREACH MAY TURN OUT TO BE ALMOST AS BAD AS THE DISEASE. THE MAJORITY LIMITS AUER BY ARTICULATING A SERIES OF EXCEPTIONS THAT ARE THEMSELVES AMBIGUOUS. "WHETHER TO APPLY [AUER] DEPENDS ON A RANGE OF CONSIDERATIONS, AND "THE LIMITS OF AUER DEFERENCE ARE NOT SUSCEPTIBLE TO ANY RIGID TEST." IN DETERMINING WHETHER AUER APPLIES AT ALL, A COURT MUST CONSIDER "THE CHARACTER AND CONTEXT OF THE AGENCY INTERPRETATION." THIS INQUIRY "DOES NOT REDUCE TO ANY EXHAUSTIVE TEST," BUT DOES RELY ON "SOME ESPECIALLY IMPORTANT MARKERS." THESE "MARKERS AND THE EXCEPTIONS IS LIKELY TO GENERATE VOLUMINOUS "THRESHOLD" LITIGATION OVER WHETHER AUER APPLIES AT ALL, SIMILAR TO THE "THRESHOLD" LITIGATION THAT ALREADY BEDEVILS THE APPLICATION OF CHEVRON DEFERENCE. THE KISOR MAJORITY'S FAILURE TO FULLY RESPECT PRINCIPLES OF SEPARATION OF POWERS, CONSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE AND DEMOCRATIC ACCOUNTABILITY IS DISAPPOINTING, BUT, HOPEFULLY JUST THE BEGINNING OF EFFORTS TO LIMIT BUREAUCRATIC POWER. ATLANTIC LEGAL FOUNDATION FILED AN AMICUS BRIEF ON THE MERITS URGING THE U.S. SUPREME COURT TO OVERTURN AUER V. ROBBINS, A PRECEDENT THAT, WE ARGUE, VIOLATES THE SEPARATION OF POWERS BY REQUIRING THE JUDICIARY TO TREAT AS BINDING THE EXECUTIVE'S INTERPRETATIONS OF ITS OWN REGULATIONS. WE URGED THE COURT TO OVERTURN AUER AND RESTORE THE SEPARATION OF POWERS UNDER WHICH IT IS "THE DUTY OF THE JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT TO SAY WHAT THE LAW IS." MARBURY V. MADISON, 1 CRANCH 137, 177 (1803). DESPITE ITS SHORTCOMINGS, KISOR MAY BE ONE OF THE MOST SIGNIFICANT CASES OF THE COURT'S RECENT TERM. SOUND SCIENCE - ADMISSIBILITY OF EXPERT EVIDENCE -PROOF OF MEDICAL CAUSATION JUNI V. A.O.. SMITH WATER PRODUCTS, NEW YORK COURT OF APPEALS, ASBESTOS. BURDEN OF PROOF. "CUMULATIVE EXPOSURE" THEORY. |
| COURTS HAVE LONG TRIED TO MANAGE ASBESTOS DOCKETS SWOLLEN WITH CLAIMANTS | ALLEGING THEY HAVE ASBESTOSIS, LUNG CANCER OR MESOTHELIOMA. EARLY ASBESTOS LAWSUITS TARGETED PRODUCERS OF ASBESTOS AND ASBESTOS CONTAINING PRODUCTS, WHICH NUMBERED IN THE HUNDREDS (IN 1982, ABOUT 300 SUCH COMPANIES). HOWEVER, AS THESE DEFENDANTS DECLARED BANKRUPTCY (AND THE DIRECT PRODUCERS ESTABLISHED "TRUST FUNDS" TO COMPENSATE VICTIMS), WAVES OF NEW LAWSUITS SPREAD TO COMPANIES FARTHER REMOVED FROM DIRECT PRODUCTION. THE MOST COMMON "DEEP POCKET" DEFENDANTS ARE MANUFACTURERS OF MACHINERY THAT USED ASBESTOS AS INSULATING, GASKET OR "FRICTION" MATERIAL (SUCH AS AUTOMOBILE BRAKES AND CLUTCHES) OR CONSTRUCTION MATERIAL THAT USED MATERIALS THAT HAD AN INCIDENTAL AMOUNT OF ASBESTOS (SUCH AS WALL BOARD, JOINT COMPOUND, CEMENT BLOCKS, PLASTER, ETC.). NEW YORK COUNTY SUPREME COURT (NEW YORK STATE'S TRIAL COURT OF GENERAL JURISDICTION) IN JUNI V. A.O. SMITH WATER PRODUCTS SET ASIDE A JURY VERDICT TOTALING $11 MILLION AWARDED AGAINST FORD MOTOR COMPANY IN FAVOR OF A MOTOR VEHICLE MECHANIC WHO HAD DIED FROM MESOTHELIOMA. THE TRIAL COURT'S OPINION IS A THOROUGH AND CLEAR EXPLICATION OF THE CLASH BETWEEN EXPERTS' HYPOTHESES, AND "GOOD" SCIENCE. IT EXPOSED THE TENSIONS BETWEEN WHAT THE PLAINTIFF'S EXPERTS CLAIMED AND WHAT NEW YORK'S LEGAL STANDARDS REQUIRE FOR RELIABLE AND ADMISSIBLE EXPERT TESTIMONY. THE TRIAL COURT REJECTED" THE "SINGLE FIBER" THEORY, WHICH IS BASED ON THE NOTION THAT A "SINGLE FIBER" OF ANY TYPE OF ASBESTOS CAUSES DISEASE CUMULATIVELY AND, THEREFORE, IS A "SUBSTANTIAL FACTOR" IN CAUSING THE DISEASE. SINGLE FIBER TESTIMONY HAS BEEN REJECTED BY A GROWING NUMBER OF APPELLATE COURTS OUTSIDE NEW YORK. THE TRIAL COURT ANALYZED PLAINTIFF'S EXPERT TESTIMONY AND HELD THAT THE RELIABILITY OF THESE OPINIONS AND THE UNDERLYING METHODOLOGIES WERE GOVERNED BY THE ADMISSIBILITY STANDARDS ARTICULATED IN PARKER V. MOBIL OIL CORP. AND CORNELL V. 360 W. 51ST ST. REALTY. IF "NOVEL" SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE IS INVOLVED, THE COURT APPLIES THE "GENERAL ACCEPTANCE" TEST ARTICULATED IN FRYE V. UNITED STATES (D.C. CIR. 1924) TO DETERMINE "WHETHER THE ACCEPTED TECHNIQUES, WHEN PROPERLY PERFORMED, GENERATE RESULTS ACCEPTED AS RELIABLE WITHIN THE SCIENTIFIC COMMUNITY GENERALLY." IF THE ANSWER IS "NO," THE TESTIMONY MUST BE EXCLUDED. IF THE ANSWER IS "YES," THE PROPONENT OF THE NOVEL SCIENTIFIC TESTIMONY HAS SURVIVED THE THRESHOLD TEST BUT STILL HAS TO GET PAST THE ADMISSIBILITY "GATE AND THE PROFFERED SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE MUST THEN MEET A SECOND, "FOUNDATIONAL RELIABILITY" INQUIRY. THIS SECOND ADMISSIBILITY STANDARD APPLIES TO ALL EXPERT TESTIMONY, NOT JUST NOVEL SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE. IN PARKER, THE COURT SAID THE FRYE INQUIRY IS "SEPARATE AND DISTINCT FROM THE ADMISSIBILITY QUESTION APPLIED TO ALL EVIDENCE WHETHER THERE IS A PROPER FOUNDATION TO DETERMINE WHETHER THE ACCEPTED METHODS WERE APPROPRIATELY EMPLOYED IN A PARTICULAR CASE." PARKER DECLARED THAT THE FOCUS MOVES "FROM THE GENERAL RELIABILITY CONCERNS OF FRYE TO THE SPECIFIC RELIABILITY OF THE PROCEDURES FOLLOWED TO GENERATE THE EVIDENCE PROFFERED AND WHETHER THEY ESTABLISH A FOUNDATION FOR THE RECEPTION OF EVIDENCE AT TRIAL." PLAINTIFF'S GENERAL CAUSATION EXPERT TESTIFIED THAT ALL INSTANCES OF ASBESTOS EXPOSURE ARE "VIEWED AS A WHOLE," CUMULATIVELY CONTRIBUTING TO AND CAUSING THE ILLNESS. HE STATED THAT "EVERY PART OF THAT EXPOSURE" ACTS AS A CONTRIBUTING FACTOR AND NO EXPOSURE CAN BE DISCOUNTED, NO MATTER HOW REMOTE THE OCCURRENCE, AS "IT'S THE CUMULATIVE EXPOSURE THAT MATTERS." HE ALSO OPINED THAT CHRYSOTILE FIBERS IN FRICTION PRODUCTS (E.G., BRAKES, CLUTCHES AND GASKETS) CAN CAUSE MESOTHELIOMA. MARKOWITZ ACKNOWLEDGED THAT 21 OF 22 EPIDEMIOLOGICAL STUDIES ON WORKERS WITH FRICTION PRODUCTS "YIELDED NO EVIDENCE OF AN INCREASED RISK OF DEVELOPING AN ASBESTOS RELATED DISEASE," BUT HE RELIED ON INDUSTRIAL HYGIENE STUDIES THAT INVOLVED FACTORY WORKERS WHO PRODUCED FRICTION PRODUCTS FROM RAW ASBESTOS. PLAINTIFF'S EXPERT ON SPECIFIC CAUSATION, TESTIFIED THAT DECEDENT'S CUMULATIVE ASBESTOS EXPOSURES CAUSED HIS MESOTHELIOMA; THAT IT IS NOT POSSIBLE TO SEPARATE OUT OR EXCLUDE ANY PARTICULAR EXPOSURE; AND THAT ALL OF JUNI'S ASBESTOS EXPOSURES IN AND AROUND WORK ON BRAKES AND CLUTCHES CONSTITUTED "SUBSTANTIAL CONTRIBUTING FACTORS IN CAUSING HIS DISEASE." THE COURT LISTED THE ITEMS UPON WHICH THE EXPERT BASED HER OPINION. HOWEVER, THE EXPERT CONCEDED THAT SHE DID NOT KNOW THE AMOUNT, DURATION, OR FREQUENCY OF PLAINTIFF'S EXPOSURES TO PRODUCTS WITH ASBESTOS CONTAINING DUST SOLD OR DISTRIBUTED BY DEFENDANT. SHE COULD NOT AND DID NOT ESTABLISH A DOSE RESPONSE RELATIONSHIP OR EVEN MINIMALLY QUANTIFY JUNI'S EXPOSURES. NEW YORK LAW REQUIRES PLAINTIFF TO ESTABLISH SOME QUANTIFIABLE LEVEL OF EXPOSURE. PARKER REQUIRES SUCH QUANTIFICATION. THE "EVERY SINGLE EXPOSURE" ARGUMENT IS IRRECONCILABLE WITH THE WELL-RECOGNIZED SCIENTIFIC REQUIREMENT THAT THE AMOUNT, DURATION AND FREQUENCY OF EXPOSURE BE CONSIDERED IN ASSESSING THE SUFFICIENCY OF AN EXPOSURE TO INCREASE THE RISK OF DEVELOPING A DISEASE. IN PARKER, A SERVICE STATION EMPLOYEE LINKED HIS LEUKEMIA DIAGNOSIS TO EXPOSURE TO BENZENE IN GASOLINE. IN A 2006 DECISION, THE COURT OF APPEALS DECIDED THAT PLAINTIFFS NEEDED TO SHOW EVIDENCE THEY HAD BEEN EXPOSED TO LEVELS OF TOXIN THAT COULD HAVE CAUSED THE DISEASE. IN NOVEMBER 2018 THE NEW YORK COURT OF APPEALS DECIDED THERE WAS INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO ESTABLISH THAT FORD MOTOR CO. CAUSED JUNI'S MESOTHELIOMA, AFFIRMING THE DECISION THAT REVERSED AN $11 MILLION JURY VERDICT HOLDING THE AUTO MANUFACTURER PARTLY LIABLE FOR HIS INJURIES. THE COURT SAID IN A ONE PARAGRAPH MEMORANDUM THAT THE TRIAL COURT'S DECISION TOSSING THE JURY'S VERDICT SHOULD BE UPHELD BASED ON THE EVIDENCE, OR LACK THEREOF, PRESENTED DURING TRIAL: "VIEWING THE EVIDENCE IN THE LIGHT MOST FAVORABLE TO PLAINTIFFS, THE EVIDENCE WAS INSUFFICIENT AS A MATTER OF LAW TO ESTABLISH THAT RESPONDENT FORD MOTOR COMPANY'S CONDUCT WAS A PROXIMATE CAUSE OF THE DECEDENT'S INJURIES PURSUANT TO THE STANDARDS SET FORTH IN PARKER V. MOBIL OIL." ATLANTIC LEGAL FILED A SUBSTANTIAL AND DETAILED AMICUS BRIEF, WHICH WAS ONE OF ONLY A FEW FILED IN SUPPORT OF FORD. IT IS SOMEWHAT DISAPPOINTING THAT THE COURT OF APPEALS DISPOSED OF JUNI IN SUMMARY FASHION. WE, ALONG WITH THE PLAINTIFFS AND DEFENSE BARS, ANTICIPATED THAT JUNI WOULD BE A WATERSHED CASE. PERHAPS THE COURT VIEWED THE ISSUE AS "ROUTINE" AFTER THE SERIES OF CASES IT HAS DECIDED IN THE LAST SEVERAL YEARS, (PARKER V. MOBIL OIL CORP., 7 N.Y.3D 434 (2006), CORNELL V. 360 W. 51ST ST. REALTY, LLC, 22 N.Y.3D 762 (2014) SEAN R. V. BMW OF N. AM., LLC, 26 N.Y.3D 801 (N.Y. 2016)) IN WHICH THE COURT OF APPEALS HAS (A) CLARIFIED THE STANDARDS FOR A TOXIC TORT PLAINTIFF'S BURDEN AND (B) HAS CLARIFIED THE STANDARDS FOR THE ADMISSIBILITY OF EXPERT EVIDENCE. DELISLE V. CRANE CO. - FLORIDA SUPREME COURT - MERIT - SEPARATION OF POWERS, SOUND SCIENCE. DECIDED OCTOBER 2018. IN DELISLE THE FLORIDA SUPREME COURT REVERSED ITSELF IN A SIGNIFICANT CASE ON THE ADMISSIBILITY OF EXPERT TESTIMONY ON EXPOSURE TO ASBESTOS AND CAUSATION OF MESOTHELIOMA. THIS CASE INVOLVED TWO ISSUES: (1) SEPARATION OF POWERS WHETHER THE LEGISLATURE CAN ENACT A LAW GOVERNING THE ADMISSIBILITY OF EVIDENCE, OR WHETHER THAT INFRINGES THE POWER OF THE JUDICIAL BRANCH; AND (2) WHETHER AN EXPERT'S CAUSATION TESTIMONY BASED ON "CUMULATIVE EXPOSURE" THAT DOES NOT IDENTIFY A SPECIFIC DEFENDANT'S PRODUCT AS THE CAUSE OF THE DISEASE IS CONSISTENT WITH SOUND SCIENCE AND ADMISSIBLE. THE FLORIDA SUPREME COURT INITIALLY HELD THAT THE STATE LEGISLATURE'S ADOPTION OF AMENDMENTS TO THE RULES OF EVIDENCE ADOPTING A DAUBERT STANDARD CONTRAVENED THE JUDICIARY'S CONSTITUTIONAL POWER TO DETERMINE JUDICIAL PROCEDURES AND THUS WAS VOID. SUBSEQUENTLY, IN THE SAME CASE IN WHICH ATLANTIC LEGAL FILED AN AMICUS BRIEF ON BEHALF OF SEVERAL PROMINENT SCIENTISTS -- BUT AFTER A CHANGE IN THE COMPOSITION OF THE COURT, THE COURT ITSELF APPROVED THE DAUBERT-LIKE ANALYSIS OF THE ADMISSIBILITY OF EXPERT TESTIMONY WHICH WE HAD ADVOCATED. AS A RESULT, FLORIDA HAS JOINED A GROWING MAJORITY OF STATES THAT HAVE ADOPTED DAUBERT CRITERIA. THIS CASE INVOLVES THE ADMISSIBILITY OF EXPERT TESTIMONY ON CAUSATION OF MESOTHELIOMA AND EXPOSURE TO ASBESTOS. THERE WERE TWO ISSUES: (1) SEPARATION OF POWERS WHETHER THE STATE LEGISLATURE CAN ENACT A LAW GOVERNING THE ADMISSIBILITY OF EVIDENCE, OR WHETHER THAT INFRINGES THE POWER OF THE JUDICIAL BRANCH TO CONTROL LEGAL PROCEEDINGS; AND (2) WHETHER AN EXPERT'S CAUSATION TESTIMONY BASED ON A "CUMULATIVE EXPOSURE" THEORY THAT DOES NOT IDENTIFY A SPECIFIC DEFENDANT'S PRODUCT AS THE CAUSE OF THE DISEASE OR QUANTIFY THE DECEDENT'S EXPOSURE TO ASBESTOS IN DEFENDANT'S PRODUCT IS CONSISTENT WITH SOUND SCIENCE AND ADMISSIBLE. |
| IN LATE 2017, ATLANTIC LEGAL FILED AN AMICUS BRIEF ON BEHALF OF SEVERAL | PROMINENT SCIENTISTS WHO ARE EXPERTS IN FIELDS RELEVANT TO MEDICAL CAUSATION. IN THAT BRIEF WE ARGUED THAT THE "CUMULATIVE EXPOSURE" THEORY IS INCONSISTENT WITH APPROPRIATE SCIENTIFIC INQUIRY AS TO MEDICAL CAUSATION, WHICH REQUIRES THAT BOTH "GENERAL CAUSATION" (THAT A PARTICULAR SUBSTANCE CAN CAUSE THE DISEASE WHICH INJURED THE PLAINTIFF) AND "SPECIFIC CAUSATION" (THAT THE INTENSITY, DURATION AND DOSAGE OF THE SUBSTANCE TO WHICH THE PLAINTIFF WAS EXPOSED HAS BEEN SHOWN TO CAUSE THE DISEASE IN QUESTION. THIS IS ESPECIALLY ESSENTIAL WHERE PERSONS ARE EXPOSED TO "BACKGROUND" LEVELS OF THE ACCUSED SUBSTANCE AND WHERE THE PLAINTIFF HAS BEEN EXPOSED TO A PARTICULAR SUBSTANCE FROM MULTIPLE SOURCES. ALF CONTINUES TO BE THE NATION'S FOREMOST PUBLIC INTEREST LAW FIRM ADVOCATING FOR USE OF SOUND SCIENCE IN JUDICIAL AND REGULATORY PROCEEDINGS. OUR ADVOCACY IN THIS AREA BUILDS UPON THE FOUNDATION'S NOTABLE AMICUS PARTICIPATION IN THE SUPREME COURT'S DAUBERT TRILOGY OF CASES, WHICH SET THE STANDARD FOR ADMISSIBILITY OF RELIABLE EXPERT TESTIMONY IN FEDERAL COURTS, AND SUBSEQUENTLY, IN MOST STATE COURTS. WE FILED A SUPREME COURT AMICUS BRIEF IN BP V. BALTIMORE, ARGUING THAT STATE-LAW "PUBLIC NUISANCE" SUITS BROUGHT BY STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENTS AGAINST FOSSIL FUEL ENERGY COMPANIES FOR THE COST OF REMEDIATING ENVIRONMENTAL HARM ALLEGEDLY CAUSED BY CARBON EMISSIONS FROM THOSE COMPANIES' PRODUCTS (E.G., GASOLINE) SHOULD BE ADJUDICATEDIF AT ALLIN FEDERAL RATHER THAN STATE COURTS. THE SUPREME COURT RULED FAVORABLY IN THE CASE, WHICH INVOLVED A RELATIVELY NARROW SCOPE-OF-JUDICIAL-REVIEW ISSUE THAT NONETHELESS GREATLY FACILITATES THE REMOVAL (I.E., TRANSFER) OF SUCH SUITS FROM PLAINTIFF-FRIENDLY STATE COURTS TO MORE SOPHISTICATED FEDERAL COURTS. INSIDE CLIMATE NEWS QUOTED ALF'S EVP-GC LARRY EBNER ABOUT THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE BP CASE BOTH BEFORE AND AFTER THE SUPREME COURT'S DECISION. IN JOHNSON & JOHNSON V. INGHAM WE FILED A SUPREME COURT AMICUS BRIEF URGING THE COURT TO REVIEW THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF A MULTI-BILLION DOLLAR COMPENSATORY AND PUNITIVE DAMAGES AWARD RENDERED BY A MISSOURI STATE COURT JURY IN MASS-ACTION LITIGATION ALLEGING THAT USE OF JOHNSON'S BABY POWDER CAUSED OVARIAN CANCER DUE TO THE ALLEGED PRESENCE OF ASBESTOS FIBERS IN THE PRODUCT. CONSISTENT WITH DAUBERT AND ITS PROGENY, ALF'S BRIEF ARGUED THAT PRODUCT LIABILITY DEFENDANTS SUCH AS JOHNSON & JOHNSON ARE DEPRIVED OF DUE PROCESS IF STATE COURT JUDGES FAIL TO ACT AS GATEKEEPERS WHO SHIELD JURIES FROM THE CONFUSION AND BIAS PRODUCED BY EXPERT WITNESS TESTIMONY THAT IS BASED ON "JUNK SCIENCE." AS A FOLLOW UP TO ALF'S AMICUS BRIEF, LAW360 (THE NATION'S LEADING DAILY ONLINE LEGAL PUBLICATION) PUBLISHED ALF'S EVP-GC LARRY EBNER'S OP-ED, KEEP JUNK SCIENCE AWAY FROM JURIES. ALTHOUGH THE SUPREME COURT DECLINED TO REVIEW INGHAM, WE WILL BE FILING AN AMICUS BRIEF URGING THE COURT TO HEAR A DIFFERENT TYPE OF TALC CASE, JOHNSON & JOHNSON V. FITCH EX REL. MISSISSIPPI. IN FITCH THE MISSISSIPPI ATTORNEY GENERAL, WITH THE ASSISTANCE OF THE PLAINTIFFS' BAR, SEEKS A POTENTIALLY ASTRONOMICAL AMOUNT OF DAMAGES, DISGORGEMENT OF PROFITS, AND OTHER MONETARY PENALTIES BASED ON ALLEGATIONS THAT JOHNSON & JOHNSON VIOLATED THE STATE CONSUMER PROTECTION STATUTE AS FAR BACK AS 1974 BY SELLING BABY POWDER WITHOUT WARNING CONSUMERS THAT THE PRODUCT CAN CAUSE CANCER. THE KEY LEGAL ISSUE IS WHETHER THE FEDERAL FOOD, DRUG, AND COSMETIC ACT PREEMPTS MISSISSIPPI'S SUIT SINCE THE FOOD AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION, AFTER REVIEWING EXTENSIVE SCIENTIFIC DATA, DETERMINED THAT A CANCER WARNING IS NOT WARRANTED. WE ANTICIPATE THAT ALF'S AMICUS BRIEF WILL TAP INTO OUR CONSIDERABLE EXPERTISE ON FEDERAL PREEMPTION ISSUES, AS WELL AS ADVOCATE FOR THE NEED TO RELY ON SOUND SCIENCE. ALONG THE SAME LINES, IN JOHNSON V. MONSANTO CO., WE URGED THE CALIFORNIA SUPREME COURT TO ADDRESS THE QUESTION OF WHETHER STATE-LAW FAILURE-TO-WARN CLAIMS ARE PREEMPTED BY THE FEDERAL INSECTICIDE, FUNGICIDE, AND RODENTICIDE ACT IN CONNECTION WITH ROUNDUP HERBICIDE. THE U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY HAS DETERMINED THAT THE PRODUCT DOES NOT CAUSE CANCER, AND THAT A CANCER WARNING ON THE PRODUCT'S LABELING WOULD BE FALSE AND MISLEADING AND A VIOLATION OF FEDERAL LAW. NONETHELESS, THE STATE SUPREME COURT DECLINED TO REVIEW A LOWER APPELLATE COURT'S RULING THAT THE PLAINTIFF'S FAILURE-TO-WARN CLAIMS ARE NOT PREEMPTED. WE ARE MONITORING TWO FEDERAL COURT OF APPEALS CASESHARDEMAN V. MONSANTO (9TH CIR.) AND CARSON V. MONSANTO (11TH CIR.)THAT INVOLVE ROUNDUP AND RAISE THE SAME FEDERAL PREEMPTION ISSUE. IF MONSANTO SEEKS SUPREME COURT REVIEW IN EITHER OR BOTH CASES, WE PLAN TO PROVIDE AMICUS SUPPORT. IN ANOTHER SCIENCE-RELATED CASE, PRESERVE RESPONSIBLE SHORELINE MANAGEMENT V. CITY OF BAINBRIDGE ISLAND, WHICH ALSO INVOLVED PROTECTION OF PRIVATE PROPERTY RIGHTS, ALF FILED AN AMICUS BRIEF SUPPORTING THE PACIFIC LEGAL FOUNDATION'S PETITION FOR SUPREME COURT REVIEW. THE CASE INVOLVED A DUE-PROCESS CHALLENGE TO AN ONEROUS, LOCAL GOVERNMENT-IMPOSED SHORELINE MANAGEMENT PLAN AFFECTING PRIVATE PROPERTY OWNERS ALONG PUGET SOUND. THE WASHINGTON STATE COURTS REFUSED TO ALLOW THE PROPERTY OWNERS TO PRESENT SCIENTIFIC TESTIMONY TO SUPPORT THEIR CONTENTION THAT THE SHORELINE MANAGEMENT PLAN EFFECTED AN UNCONSTITUTIONAL TAKING OF THEIR PROPERTY. OUR AMICUS BRIEF ARGUED THAT COURTS SHOULD NOT RELY ON THE SO-CALLED "PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE" A "BETTER SAFE THAN SORRY" APPROACH TO ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION WHERE RELIABLE SCIENTIFIC DATA ARE AVAILABLE. ALTHOUGH STATISTICALLY, THE CHANCES THAT THE COURT WILL AGREE TO HEAR A GIVEN CASE ARE QUITE LOW, WE BELIEVED THAT THIS WAS A CASE WHERE THE STATE COURT'S ERRONEOUS EXCLUSION OF SCIENTIFIC TESTIMONY NEEDED TO BE MEMORIALIZED IN AN AMICUS BRIEF. AS AN ADJUNCT TO ALF'S SOUND SCIENCE-RELATED AMICUS ACTIVITIES, WE PLAN TO PROVIDE COMMENTS THIS FALL ON A FEDERAL JUDICIARY PROPOSAL THAT WOULD STRENGTHEN THE STANDARDS UNDER FEDERAL RULE OF EVIDENCE 702 FOR ADMISSION OF RELIABLE EXPERT TESTIMONY. INDIVIDUAL LIBERTY / SCHOOL CHOICE ALF CONTINUES TO FILE AMICUS BRIEFS IN CASES THAT CHALLENGE GOVERNMENTAL OR JUDICIAL DEPRIVATION OF INDIVIDUALS' CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS, RANGING FROM THE FIRST AMENDMENT RIGHTS TO FREE SPEECH, ASSOCIATION, AND RELIGION, TO THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY, TO THE RIGHT TO AN INDIVIDUAL'S OWN IDENTITY. THIS ALSO INCLUDES PARENTS' RIGHT TO CHOOSE ELEMENTARY AND SECONDARY SCHOOLS THAT THEY BELIEVE ARE BEST SUITED FOR THEIR CHILDREN. IN AMERICANS FOR PROSPERITY FOUNDATION V. BONTA, ALF JOINED WITH THE NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF MANUFACTURERS AND SEVERAL TRADE ASSOCIATIONS IN A MERITS-STAGE AMICUS BRIEF SUPPORTING A CONSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGE TO A CALIFORNIA STATE LAW THAT REQUIRED CHARITABLE ORGANIZATIONS TO IDENTIFY THEIR MAJOR DONORS. THE CALIFORNIA ATTORNEY GENERAL'S OFFICE ASSERTED THAT IT NEEDED SUCH INFORMATION SO THAT IT COULD MONITOR CHARITABLE DONATIONS FOR FRAUDULENT ACTIVITY. THE AMICUS BRIEF ARGUED THAT ANONYMITY IS NECESSARY SO THAT COMPANIES AND INDIVIDUALS CAN FREELY ASSOCIATE WITH, FINANCIALLY SUPPORT, AND COLLECTIVELY SPEAK THROUGH, NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS. THE SUPREME COURT ISSUED A FAVORABLE OPINION, HOLDING THAT THE CALIFORNIA STATUTE, ON ITS FACE, IS AN UNCONSTITUTIONAL DEPRIVATION OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT "RIGHT TO ASSOCIATE." IN CROWE V. OREGON STATE BAR, ALF HAS JOINED THE PACIFIC LEGAL FOUNDATION AND CATO INSTITUTE IN AN AMICUS BRIEF URGING THE SUPREME COURT TO REVIEW A CASE PRESENTING THE QUESTION OF WHETHER COMPELLING ATTORNEYS TO PAY STATE BAR ASSOCIATIONS DUES THAT ARE USED IN PART TO FUND A BAR ASSOCIATION'S POLITICAL OR IDEOLOGICAL SPEECH OR ACTIVITIES CANNOT WITHSTAND "EXACTING SCRUTINY" UNDER THE FIRST AMENDMENT. AFTER THE AMICUS BRIEF WAS FILED, LAW360 ASKED ALF-GC LARRY EBNER TO COMMENT ON THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE CASE. WE ALSO FILED AN AMICUS BRIEF URGING THE COURT TO REVIEW HAMILTON V. SPEIGHT, A CASE WHICH PITTED A VIDEO GAME COMPANY'S FREEDOM OF ARTISTIC EXPRESSION AGAINST AN INDIVIDUAL'S RIGHT TO HIS OWN PERSONA, WHICH HAD BEEN TRANSFORMED WITHOUT HIS PERMISSION OR COMPENSATION INTO A VIOLENTLY ABHORRENT VIDEO GAME CHARACTER. |
| ALF'S AMICUS BRIEF ARGUED THAT REGARDLESS OF WHAT JUDICIAL BALANCING TEST | THERE IS NO JUSTIFICATION FOR HIGH-TECH IDENTIFY THEFT OF AN INDIVIDUAL'S FACE OR VOICE WITHOUT THEIR PERMISSION OR AT LEAST PAYMENT OF COMPENSATION. WE ARE CONSIDERING FILING OR JOINING AN AMICUS BRIEF IN CARSON V. MAKIN, WHICH THE SUPREME COURT, ON ITS FINAL DAY BEFORE SUMMER RECESS, ANNOUNCED THAT IT WILL HEAR NEXT TERM. THIS IS A SCHOOL CHOICE CASE INVOLVING PARENTS' RIGHT TO USE STATE EDUCATIONAL SUBSIDIES TO SEND THEIR CHILDREN TO PRIVATE SCHOOLS THAT PROVIDE RELIGIOUS INSTRUCTION IN ADDITION TO SECULAR EDUCATION. THE MAINE STATUTE AT ISSUE PROVIDES STATE FINANCIAL SUBSIDIES FOR CHILDREN WHO LIVE IN SCHOOL DISTRICTS THAT DO NOT HAVE THEIR OWN SECONDARY SCHOOLS, AND THUS, MUST PAY TO ATTEND PUBLIC OR PRIVATE SECONDARY SCHOOLS ELSEWHERE. ALTHOUGH ALF'S PRIMARY FOCUS ON SCHOOL CHOICE IS CHARTER SCHOOLS, WE BELIEVE THAT PARENTS' RIGHT TO CHOOSE SCHOOLS BEST SUITED FOR THEIR CHILDREN ALSO EXTENDS TO SCHOOLS THAT PROVIDE RELIGIOUS INSTRUCTION. FREE ENTERPRISE / LIMITED & EFFICIENT GOVERNMENT ALF'S FREE ENTERPRISE DOCKET OF AMICUS BRIEFS ENCOMPASSES A BROAD RANGE OF CIVIL JUSTICE AND GOVERNMENT REGULATORY ISSUES THAT AFFECT THE ABILITY OF AMERICAN COMPANIES OF ALL SIZES TO CONDUCT BUSINESS, PROSPER, AND SERVE THE PUBLIC. SOME OF THESE CASES, PARTICULARLY IN THE PRODUCT LIABILITY ARENA, ALSO IMPLICATE THE NEED FOR SOUND SCIENCE IN JUDICIAL AND REGULATORY PROCEEDINGS. WE FILED AN AMICUS BRIEF IN THE NINTH CIRCUIT SUPPORTING A PETITION FOR REHEARING EN BANC IN AXON ENTERPRISE, INC. V. FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION. THE ISSUE IN THE CASE IS WHETHER A CORPORATION OR INDIVIDUAL DEFENDANT IN AN ADMINISTRATIVE ENFORCEMENT PROCEEDING BROUGHT BY THE FTC BEFORE ITS OWN "IN HOUSE" ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE WHO ALMOST ALWAYS RULES IN THE FTC'S FAVOR CAN CHALLENGE THE STRUCTURAL CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE PROCEEDING IN A DISTRICT COURT SUIT WITHOUT HAVING TO FIRST ENDURE THE COSTS, BURDENS, RISKS, AND REPUTATIONAL AND FINANCIAL HARM OF SUCH AN ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDING. THE ISSUE IS IMPORTANT BECAUSE SUPREME COURT PRECEDENT ESTABLISHES THAT FEDERAL GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS (LIKE THE FTC'S ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE) WHO ARE SUBJECT TO REMOVAL ONLY FOR CAUSE HOLD OFFICE IN VIOLATION OF THE PRESIDENT'S POWER TO REMOVE FEDERAL OFFICERS AT WILL. ALF'S AMICUS BRIEF ESSENTIALLY ARGUED THAT "JUSTICE DELAYED IS JUSTICE DENIED" BECAUSE JUDICIAL REVIEW OF A STRUCTURALLY UNCONSTITUTIONAL PROCEEDING WOULD BE MEANINGLESS IF THE DEFENDANT FIRST MUST SUFFER THROUGH THE ENTIRE PROCEEDING. LAW360 DEVOTED AN ENTIRE ARTICLE TO ALF'S AMICUS BRIEF. THE NINTH CIRCUIT DENIED REHEARING, HOWEVER, AND AXON IS NOW SEEKING SUPREME COURT REVIEW, WHICH ALF WILL BE SUPPORTING WITH AN UPDATED AMICUS BRIEF. ESSENTIALLY THE SAME JUDICIAL REVIEW ISSUE IS BEING LITIGATED IN CONNECTION WITH THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, WHICH LIKE THE FTC, TYPICALLY PURSUES CIVIL ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS BEFORE ITS OWN ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGES RATHER THAN IN A FEDERAL DISTRICT COURT. WE FILED AN AMICUS BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF THE UNSUCCESSFUL REVIEW PETITION IN GIBSON V. SEC, WHICH RAISED THE ISSUE, AND NOW ARE AWAITING THE RULING OF THE EN BANC FIFTH CIRCUIT IN COCHRAN V. SEC. IF A REVIEW PETITION IS FILED IN THAT CASE, WE ANTICIPATE FILING AN AMICUS BRIEF URGING THE SUPREME COURT TO GRANT REVIEW. ALF WILL BE FILING AN AMICUS BRIEF SUPPORTING THE FORTHCOMING SUPREME COURT REVIEW PETITION IN AMN SERVICES V. CLARKE. ALTHOUGH THIS IS PRIMARILY A FAIR LABOR STANDARDS ACT CASE, IT RAISES A BROADER ISSUE CONCERNING THE CIRCUMSTANCES UNDER WHICH COURTS SHOULD GIVE DEFERENCE TO INTERNAL FEDERAL AGENCY GUIDANCE DOCUMENTS SUCH AS FIELD MANUALS FOR AGENCY PERSONNEL. WE ANTICIPATE THAT OUR AMICUS BRIEF WILL ADDRESS THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THAT ASPECT OF THE CASE. WE ALSO FILED AN AMICUS BRIEF URGING SUPREME COURT REVIEW IN IQVIA V, MUSSAT, A CLASS ACTION PRESENTING THE QUESTION OF WHETHER THE PRINCIPLES OF "SPECIFIC PERSONAL JURISDICTION" APPLICABLE TO THE CLAIMS OF NONRESIDENT PLAINTIFFS IN A STATE-COURT MASS TORT ACTION (PRINCIPLES THAT THE SUPREME COURT ARTICULATED SEVERAL YEARS AGO) ALSO APPLY TO THE CLAIMS OF NONRESIDENT MEMBERS OF A PUTATIVE CLASS IN A FEDERAL DISTRICT COURT CLASS ACTION. ALF'S AMICUS BRIEF ARGUED THAT DETERRING FORUM-SHOPPING IS ONE OF THE PRINCIPAL REASONS WHY THE SAME PRINCIPLES SHOULD APPLY IN CLASS ACTIONS. THE COURT, HOWEVER, DECIDED TO LEAVE THIS IMPORTANT CLASS-ACTION ISSUE FOR ANOTHER DAY. |
| FORM 990, PART VI, SECTION A, LINE 1 | THE ORGANIZATION HAS AN EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE COMPRISED OF 10 MEMBERS OF THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS WHO HAVE THE AUTHORITY TO MAKE DECISIONS BETWEEN BOARD MEETINGS. |
| FORM 990, PART VI, SECTION B, LINE 11B | ATLANTIC LEGAL HAS ENGAGED AN OUTSIDE ACCOUNTING FIRM TO PREPARE ITS FORM 990. THE FORM 990, IS PREPARED BY THE OUTSIDE ACCOUNTING FIRM, IS PROVIDED TO THE CHAIRMAN OF THE BOARD AND EACH DIRECTOR BY ELECTRONIC MAIL PRIOR TO FILING WITH THE IRS. EACH DIRECTOR IS ASKED TO REVIEW THE FORM 990 AND PROVIDE COMMENTS OR QUESTIONS. THE OFFICERS OF THE FOUNDATION AND THE FOUNDATION'S BOOKKEEPING CONSULTANT ARE IN FREQUENT COMMUNICATION WITH THE FOUNDATION'S OUTSIDE ACCOUNTANTS BY ELECTRONIC MAIL AND TELEPHONE TO PROVIDE INFORMATION, RAISE QUESTIONS AND PROVIDE COMMENTS ON THE FORM 990 PRIOR TO FILING WITH THE IRS. AFTER ALL QUESTIONS AND COMMENTS HAVE BEEN ADDRESSED, THE FORM 990 IS PREPARED AND SUBMITTED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE FOUNDATION FOR HIS APPROVAL. IT IS THEN FILED WITH THE IRS. |
| FORM 990, PART VI, SECTION B, LINE 12C | THE FOUNDATION'S CONFLICT OF INTEREST POLICY IS SUBMITTED ANNUALLY TO EACH BOARD MEMBER, OFFICER, ADVISOR AND STAFF MEMBER FOR REVIEW AND SIGNATURE WHERE THEY MUST DISCLOSE ANY CONFLICTS OF INTEREST. CONFLICTS OF INTEREST ARE DETERMINED AND REVIEWED BY THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS OR A COMMITTEE DESIGNATED BY THE BOARD. NO BOARD MEMBER IS ALLOWED TO VOTE OR PARTICIPATE IN BOARD DISCUSSIONS ABOUT ANY MATTERS INVOLVING THE CONFLICT. |
| FORM 990, PART VI, SECTION B, LINE 15A | THE EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE OF THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS, WITHOUT PARTICIPATION OF THE PRESIDENT, DETERMINES THE COMPENSATION OF THE PRESIDENT. THE EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE CONSIDERS COMPENSATION LEVELS PAID BY SIMILARLY SITUATED ORGANIZATIONS FOR FUNCTIONALLY COMPARABLE POSITIONS IN THE SAME GEOGRAPHICAL MARKET AND NATIONWIDE. THIS PROCESS WAS LAST UNDERTAKEN IN NOVEMBER 2020 AND WAS DULY DOCUMENTED. |
| FORM 990, PART VI, SECTION C, LINE 19 | THE FOUNDATION MAKES ITS FORM 990 AVAILABLE FOR PUBLIC INSPECTION AS REQUIRED UNDER SECTION 6104 OF THE INTERNAL REVENUE CODE. THE RETURN IS POSTED ON GUIDESTAR.ORG AND OTHER SIMILAR TYPES OF WEBSITES. IN ADDITION, THE FINANCIAL STATEMENTS, ARTICLES OF INCORPORATION, FORM 990, FORM 1023, AND BY-LAWS ARE ALSO AVAILABLE UPON WRITTEN REQUEST OR BY CALLING THE ORGANIZATION DIRECTLY. |
| PART VII, SECTION A, LINE A: | LAWRENCE EBNER AND NISHANI DEVI NAIDOO'S COMPENSATION IS IN EXCHANGE FOR CONSULTING, LEGAL RESEARCH, AND COMPOSITION SERVICES THEY HAVE PROVIDED TO THE ORGANIZATION, AND THEY ARE NOT COMPENSATED FOR THEIR SERVICES AS OFFICERS. |
| FORM 990, PART XII, LINE 2C: | THE FOUNDATION IS GOVERNED BY A 27 MEMBER BOARD OF DIRECTORS, 26 OF WHOM ARE INDEPENDENT DIRECTORS. THE INDEPENDENT DIRECTORS SERVE WITHOUT COMPENSATION. THE BOARD ORDINARILY MEETS 3 TIMES A YEAR. BETWEEN BOARD MEETINGS, THE FOUNDATION IS DIRECTED BY AN EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE OF THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS, CONSISTING OF 10 DIRECTORS, 9 OF WHOM ARE INDEPENDENT DIRECTORS. THE 9 INDEPENDENT MEMBERS OF THE EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE ALSO ACT AS THE AUDIT COMMITTEE, RESPONSIBLE FOR THE OVERSIGHT OF THE AUDIT OF FINANCIAL STATEMENTS AND SELECTION OF AN INDEPENDENT OUTSIDE ACCOUNTANT/AUDITOR. THIS PROCESS HAS NOT CHANGED FROM THE PRIOR YEAR. |
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